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  ABSTRACT	  	  During	   the	   interwar	   period,	   Soviet	   authorities	   put	   a	   particular	   emphasis	   on	   fighting	  agricultural	  pests.	  Locust	  invasions	  were	  a	  tremendous	  concern	  for	  Soviet	  borderlands	  in	   the	  Caucasus	  and	  Central	  Asian.	  Anti-­‐acridian	  campaigns	   thus	  became	  an	   important	  element	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  between	  local	  populations	  and	  the	  Bolsheviks,	  embodying	  the	  Communist	  modernising	  project.	  However,	  they	  were	  also	  a	  diplomatic	  issue,	  since	  scientific	  progress	  demonstrated	  ever	  more	  clearly	   the	   transnational	  dimension	  of	   the	  locust	   threat.	   Debates	   happened	   among	   Soviet	   institutions	   as	   to	   the	   way	   this	   cross-­‐border	   dimension	   should	   be	   managed.	   As	   the	   1920s	   went	   on,	   forms	   of	   international	  cooperation	  were	  developed	  with	  Iran,	  Afghanistan	  and	  Mongolia.	  These	  relations	  were	  an	   opportunity	   to	   showcase	   the	   Soviet	   model	   of	   development	   and	   to	   gain	   political	  influence.	  Interactions	  between	  the	  USSR	  and	  Iran	  were	  especially	  advanced	  and	  served	  as	  a	  model	  for	  other	  bilateral	  agreements.	  As	  this	  paper	  argues,	  this	  relatively	  forgotten	  episode	  laid	  the	  basis	  for	  future	  Soviet	  development	  policy.	  	  	  	  
	  In	   a	   letter	   written	   on	   2	   August	   1933,	   Lev	   Karakhan,	   deputy	   People’s	   Commissar	   for	  Foreign	  Affairs,	   reminded	   the	   Soviet	   ambassador	   in	  Teheran,	   Sergej	   Pastukhov,	   of	   the	  threat	  the	  locusts	  posed	  to	  the	  Transcaucasian	  and	  Central	  Asian	  republics	  of	  the	  USSR:	  ‘You	  know	  that	  year	  after	  year	  the	  agriculture	  of	  our	  borderlands	  is	  exposed	  to	  invasions	  of	   Persian	   locusts	   and	   that,	   in	   order	   to	   prevent	   this	   threat,	   we	   have	   to	   enter	   tedious	  negociations	  with	  the	  Persian	  government	  to	  gain	  admittance	  on	  their	  soil	  for	  our	  [anti-­‐locust]	  expeditions’.1	  Locust	  pests	  are	  one	  of	  the	  most	  ancient	  threats	  to	  South	  Caucasian	  agriculture,	   as	   they	   are	   in	   many	   other	   Middle	   Eastern	   and	   Mediterranean	   regions.2	  Struggle	   against	   these	   pests,	   though,	   did	   not	   enter	   the	   realm	   of	   public	   policies	   in	   the	  region	  until	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century.	  Of	  the	  three	  empires	  bordering	  on	  the	  Caucasus,	  Russia	   and	   the	   Ottoman	   Empire	   developed	   a	   set	   of	   measures,	   while	   Persia	   lagged	  behind.	   In	   Tsarist	   Russia,	   locust	   control	   was	   connected	   to	   settlement	   policies	   on	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Letter	  from	  Karakhan	  to	  Pastukhov,	  2	  Aug.	  1933,	  in	  F.P.	  Polia	  et	  al.	  (eds)	  Dokumenty	  vneshnej	  politiky	  
SSSR,	  (Moscow:	  Gospolitizdat,	  1970)	  Vol.	  15,	  pp.	  474–6,.	  2	  The	  case	  of	  Cyprus	  has	  been	  particularly	  well	  studied	  for	  the	  medieval	  and	  modern	  period:	  Ronald	  Jennings,	  ‘The	  Locust	  Problem	  in	  Cyprus’,	  Bulletin	  of	  the	  School	  of	  Oriental	  and	  African	  Studies	  51	  (1988):	  279–313;	  Gilles	  Veinstein,	  ‘Sur	  les	  sauterelles	  à	  Chypre,	  en	  Thrace	  et	  en	  Macédoine	  à	  l’époque	  ottomane’,	  in	  I.	  Baldauf	  and	  S.	  Faroqhi	  (eds)	  Armağan:	  Festschrift	  für	  Andreas	  Tietze	  (Prague:	  Enigma,	  1994).	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outskirts	   of	   the	   empire	   and	   stood	   alongside	   the	   fight	   against	   malaria,	   nomadic	  onslaughts,	   aridity	   and	   phylloxera.3	  In	   the	   Ottoman	   Empire,	   progressive	   development	  led	  to	  a	  Provisional	  Locust	  Act	  passed	  on	  14	  November	  1912,	  which	  established	  ad	  hoc	  structures	  in	  the	  provinces,	  under	  control	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Agriculture.4	  	  The	  ascent	  of	  the	  Bolsheviks	  in	  Russia,	  and	  the	  communist	  conquest	  of	  the	  Caucasus	  in	  1920–1921,	  opened	  a	  new	  era	  in	  locust	  management.	  Agricultural	  pest	  control	  became	  a	  major	  priority	  for	  the	  new	  regime	  on	  three	  grounds.	  Ideologically,	  agricultural	  progress	  and	   the	  subjugation	  of	  nature	  was	  a	  key	   feature	  of	  communism	  and	   the	  deep	  sense	  of	  socio-­‐economic	  backwardness	   that	   accompanied	   the	  Bolsheviks	   in	   their	   rise	   to	  power	  only	  intensified	  this.	  In	  internal	  politics,	  locust	  pests	  constituted	  a	  serious	  threat	  to	  the	  border	  republics	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  especially	  Armenia,	  Azerbaijan,	  Turkmenistan	  and	  Uzbekistan,	   as	   they	  brought	   about	   food	   shortages	   and	  unrests.	   Suppressing	   the	   locust	  threat	  was	   thus	  part	  of	   a	   social	   contract	  made	  by	   the	  Bolsheviks	   in	   these	  peripheries.	  Doing	  so	  at	  the	  same	  time	  allowed	  political	  control	  over	  the	  countryside	  through	  mass	  campaigns	   and	   administrative	   structures.	   Finally,	   locust	   management	   had	   also	   to	   do	  with	   international	   relations,	   since	   locusts	   know	   no	   political	   borders	   and	   migrate	  according	   to	   various	   subcontinental	   patterns	   in	   a	   wide	   Middle-­‐Eastern	   crescent	   that	  spreads	  from	  Eastern	  Africa	  to	  Central	  Asia	  and	  India.	  Logically,	  locust	  control	  became	  a	  favourite	  topic	  for	  Soviet	  diplomats	  in	  their	  relations	  with	  Iran	  and	  Afghanistan,	  but	  also	  with	  Mongolia	  and	  the	  quasi-­‐autonomous	  Xinjiang	  in	  the	  1920s–1930s.	  	  The	  common	  point	  to	  all	   these	  dimensions	  was	  the	   idea	  that	  the	   locusts	  were	   ‘foreign’	  intruders	  and	  that	  the	  Soviet	  border	  had	  to	  be	  defended	  against	  their	  attacks.	  However,	  state	  and	  Party	  officials	  involved	  in	  the	  policy-­‐making	  process	  diverged	  on	  the	  measures	  to	  adopt.	  Analytically,	  two	  paradigms	  can	  be	  distinguished,	  even	  though	  they	  frequently	  overlapped.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   some	   argued	   that	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   should	   focus	   on	  unilateral	  and	   internal	  measures	   to	  protect	   its	   territory	  and	  turn	   its	  Southern	  political	  borders	  into	  environmental	  ones	  as	  well.	  This	  idea	  was	  clearly	  influenced	  by	  the	  general	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  For	  the	  Caucasus,	  see	  S.A.	  Melik	  Sarkisjan,	  Muganskaja	  step’.	  Estestvenno-­‐istoricheskij	  i	  sel’sko-­‐
khozjajstvennyj	  ocherk,	  pp.	  34–6,	  Saint-­‐Petersburg:	  Izdanie	  otdela	  zemel’nykh	  uluchshenij,	  1897;	  Russian	  sectants	  were	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  settler	  population	  in	  the	  1880s–90s	  and	  bore	  the	  brunt	  of	  the	  difficult	  acclimatisation:	  Nicholas	  B.	  Breyfogle,	  Heretics	  and	  Colonizers.	  Forging	  Russia’s	  Empire	  in	  the	  
South	  Caucasus	  (Ithaca;	  London:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2005)	  pp.	  87–127.	  	  4	  Çekirge	  Kânun-­‐ı	  Muvakkat,	  see	  Ertan	  Gökmen,	  ‘Batı	  Anadolu’da	  çekirge	  felâketi	  (1850–1915),	  Belleten.	  
Türk	  Tarih	  Kurumu	  74	  /	  269	  (2010):	  127–80;	  Meltem	  Toksöz,	  Nomads,	  Migrants,	  and	  Cotton	  in	  the	  Eastern	  
Mediterranean:	  The	  Making	  of	  the	  Adana-­‐Mersin	  Region,	  1850–1908	  (Leiden:	  Brill,	  2010).	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isolationist	  mood	  and	  fear	  of	  foreign	  interventions	  prevailing	  at	  the	  time.	  The	  opposite	  stance	   claimed	   that	   this	   environmental	   ‘iron	   curtain’	  was	   nothing	   short	   of	   an	   illusion	  and	  called	  for	  partnerships	  to	  be	  built	  with	  Middle	  Eastern	  and	  Asian	  neighbour	  states,	  in	   order	   jointly	   to	   manage	   locust	   plagues.	   As	   the	   1920s	   went	   on,	   this	   second	   view	  progressively	   gained	   the	  upper	  hand.	   Scientific	   factors	  played	   a	   role	   in	   this	   evolution,	  since	  the	  lifecycle	  of	  the	  locusts,	  the	  determinants	  of	  their	  transition	  from	  a	  lone	  stage,	  when	  they	  cause	  no	  harm,	   to	  a	  gregarious	  stage,	  when	  they	  grow,	  often	  change	  colour	  and	  become	  voracious	  plant-­‐eaters,	  was	  researched	  by	  numerous	  entomologists.5	  Their	  regional	  and	  continental	  geography	  was	  also	  thoroughly	  inquired	  into	  at	  the	  numerous	  research	   centres	   established	   at	   the	   time.	   The	   International	   Institute	   of	   Agriculture,	  established	   in	   1905	   in	   Rome,	   played	   no	   small	   role	   in	   the	   growing	   interconnection	   of	  locust	  experts	  around	  the	  globe.6	  	  Another	  dimension	  was,	  however,	   as	   important	   as	   scientific	   advances.	  With	   the	   fall	   of	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire,	   the	  Middle	   East	  was	   partially	   shared	   between	   France	   and	  Great	  Britain.	   New	   states	   were	   created	   and	   locust	   management	   became	   an	   issue	   which	  attracted	  great	  attention	  among	   those	  colonial	  powers.	  For	  Soviet	   leaders,	  French	  and	  British	   activism	   in	   the	   field	   concealed	   political	   ambitions	   and	  was	   part	   of	   the	   cordon	  
sanitaire	   against	   communism.	   Building	   an	   anti-­‐acridian	   cum	   anti-­‐imperialist	  international	   network	   logically	   became	   a	   priority	   for	   Soviet	   diplomats,	   from	   the	   late	  1920s,	  as	  one	  of	  the	  ways	  to	  break	  political	  isolation.7	  This	  paper	  argues	  that	  this	  project	  was	  part	  of	  the	  birth	  of	  Soviet	  development	  aid.	  Whereas	  this	  aid	  has	  been	  traditionally	  seen	   as	   a	   child	   of	   the	   Cold	  War	   and	   a	   means	   to	   win	   over	   the	   Third	  World,	   it	   seems	  important	   to	   reassess	   the	   place	   of	   the	   interwar	   period.	   What	   the	   post-­‐1945	   period	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  A	  general	  picture	  of	  scientific	  evolutions	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  is	  given	  in	  a	  classic	  work:	  Boris	  Uvarov,	  Grasshoppers	  and	  Locusts.	  A	  Handbook	  of	  General	  Acridology,	  Vol.	  1:	  Anatomy,	  
Physiology,	  Development,	  Phase	  Polymorphism,	  Introduction	  to	  Taxonomy	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1966).	  	  6	  The	  Institute	  replaced	  in	  1905	  the	  International	  Agricultural	  Commission	  created	  in	  1889,	  and	  greatly	  contributed	  to	  the	  internationalisation	  of	  agricultural	  know-­‐how.	  See	  Luciano	  Tosi,	  Alle	  Origini	  della	  FAO.	  
Le	  relazioni	  tra	  l’Istituto	  Internazionale	  di	  Agricoltura	  e	  la	  Società	  delle	  Nazioni	  (Milano:	  FrancoAngeli	  Storia,	  1989);	  Asher	  Hobson,	  The	  International	  Institute	  of	  Agriculture:	  An	  Historical	  and	  Critical	  Analysis	  of	  
its	  Organization,	  Activities	  and	  Policies	  of	  Administration	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1931).	  7	  Jon	  Jacobson,	  When	  the	  Soviets	  Entered	  World	  Politics	  (Berkeley;	  Los	  Angeles;	  London:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1994)	  pp.	  51–80;	  Harish	  Kapur,	  Soviet	  Russia	  and	  Asia,	  1917–1927.	  A	  Study	  of	  Soviet	  Policy	  
Towards	  Turkey,	  Iran,	  and	  Afghanistan	  (Geneva:	  Geneva	  Graduate	  Institute	  of	  International	  Studies,	  1966);	  Mikhail	  Volodarsky,	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  its	  Southern	  Neighbours,	  Iran	  and	  Afghanistan,	  1917–1933	  (Ilford;	  Portland:	  Frank	  Cass	  &	  Co.,	  1994).	  	  
	   4	  
actually	   achieved	  was	   the	  globalisation	  of	  policies	  developed	  along	   the	  Soviet	  borders	  before	   the	  Second	  World	  War.	  Policies	  used	   in	   the	  1920s–1930s	   to	   influence	  Kemalist	  Turkey	   and	   Pahlavi	   Persia,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   a	   trilateral	  modernising	   emulation,	  were	  extended	   to	   far-­‐off	   countries.8	  A	   case	   study	   of	   the	   Azerbaijani	   border	   between	   Persia	  and	  the	  USSR	  will	  serve	  as	  the	  testing	  ground	  for	  my	  argument.	  	  	  	  ‘DEFENDING	  THE	  BORDER’:	  REFRAMING	  LOCUSTS	  AS	  FOREIGN	  INTRUDERS.	  	  World	  War	  One	  saw	  the	  Caucasus	  as	  one	  of	   the	  main	  front-­‐lines	   in	  the	  conflict	  against	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire.	  Even	  though	  public	  attention	  was	  focused	  on	  military	  operations,	  locusts	   remained	  a	   surprisingly	   important	   concern	   in	   the	   region.	  On	  both	   sides	  of	   the	  border,	  the	  war	  exhausted	  agricultural	  and	  industrial	  resources	  and	  productivity	  was	  to	  be	   raised	   as	   part	   of	   the	   war	   effort.9	  As	   the	   Russian	   Caucasus	   was	   more	   and	   more	  required	   to	   be	   self-­‐sufficient,	   any	   attack	   against	   its	   agriculture	   was	   reconstrued	   as	   a	  state	  issue	  and	  part	  of	  the	  war	  system.10	  Locusts	  and	  other	  agricultural	  pests	  were	  now	  to	  be	  dealt	  with	  for	  military	  and	  strategic	  reasons,	  as	  cotton	  and	  food	  were	  central	   for	  waging	  the	  war.	  Insects	  being,	  to	  paraphrase	  Carl	  Johansen,	  ‘the	  only	  animals	  giving	  man	  a	  real	  battle	  of	  supremacy’,	   this	   identification	  was	  relatively	  easy.11	  The	   fact	   that	  pests	  and	  insects	  served	  often	  as	  metaphors	  to	  describe	  the	  enemy	  in	  the	  period	  inaugurated	  by	  World	  War	   One	   contributed	   to	   this	   awareness.12	  The	   Russian	  military	   presence	   in	  north-­‐western	   Persia	   that	   resulted	   from	   the	   Persian	   Revolution	   of	   1906–1911	   was	  accompanied	   by	   an	   increased	   presence	   of	   technical	   and	   military	   staff.	   Concrete	  observations	   about	   locusts	   in	   Iran	   were	   made	   and	   geographical	   connections	   became	  clearer.	  Russian	  observers	  and	  entomologists	  formulated	  hypotheses	  about	  continental	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Celal	  Metin,	  Emperyalist	  Çağda	  Modernleşme.	  Türk	  Modernleşmesi	  ve	  Iran	  (1800–1941),	  Ankara:	  Phoenix,	  2011,	  pp.	  287–308;	  Adeeb	  Khalid,	  ‘Backwardness	  and	  the	  Quest	  for	  Civilization:	  Early	  Soviet	  Central	  Asia	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective’,	  Slavic	  Review	  65	  /	  2	  (2006):	  231–251.	  	  9	  Peter	  Gatrell,	  Russia’s	  First	  World	  War.	  A	  Social	  and	  Economic	  History	  (Edinburgh:	  Pearson	  Education,	  2005)	  pp.	  108–31	  and	  154–175.	  	  10	  This	  holds	  also	  true	  for	  World	  War	  Two,	  with	  numerous	  expeditions	  led	  by	  the	  Allies	  in	  the	  broad	  Middle	  East.	  See	  for	  example,	  Alan	  S.	  Milward,	  War,	  Economy	  and	  Society,	  1939–1945	  (Berkeley;	  Los	  Angeles:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1979)	  pp.	  292–293.	  	  	  11	  See	  his	  article,	  ‘Principles	  of	  Insect	  Control’,	  in	  R.E.	  Pfadt	  (ed.)	  Fundamentals	  of	  Applied	  Entomology,	  pp.	  171–181	  (New	  York:	  Macmillan,	  1971).	  	  12	  Edmund	  P.	  Russell,	  ‘Speaking	  of	  Annihilation:	  Mobilizing	  for	  War	  Against	  Human	  and	  Insect	  Enemies,	  1914–1945’,	  Journal	  of	  American	  History	  82	  /	  4	  (1996):	  1505–1529	  and	  War	  and	  Nature.	  Fighting	  Humans	  
and	  Insects	  from	  World	  War	  I	  to	  Silent	  Spring	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2001).	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migrations	  of	  locusts.	  More	  generally,	  World	  War	  One	  corresponded	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  Northern	  Africa	  with	  a	  period	  of	  intense	  locust	  invasions.	  	  The	  Ottoman	  Empire	  was	  the	  hardest	  struck,	  with	  a	  first	  invasion	  of	  Moroccan	  locust	  in	  1914	  followed	  by	  the	  Sudanese	  locust	  in	  1915.	  Long	  debates	  on	  a	  locust	  annihilation	  Act	  took	   place	   in	   the	   Ottoman	   Chamber	   of	   Deputies	   as	   early	   as	   June	   1914.13	  Insect	   pests	  threatened	  to	  disturb	  war	  operations,	  as	  well	  as	  food	  supply	  in	  the	  region,	  and	  had	  to	  be	  eliminated.	  The	  Ministry	  of	  War	  created	   labour	  battalions	  to	   fight	  the	  scourge.	  Locusts	  nonetheless	   caused	   heavy	   losses	   in	   the	   Arab	   provinces	   at	   the	   time,	   contributing	   to	   a	  disruption	  in	  the	  regional	  economy.14	  Syria	  and	  Palestine	  suffered	  in	  the	  first	  rank,	  and	  1915	   was	   dubbed	   the	   ‘Year	   of	   the	   Locust’	   with	   a	   dispiriting	   impact	   on	   Ottoman	  soldiers.15	  Cemal	  Pasha,	   commander	  of	   the	  Fourth	  Ottoman	  Army,	  wrote:	   ‘Being	  badly	  upset	   by	   this	   natural	   disaster,	  we	  were	   pessimistically	   thinking	   how	  we	  would	   spend	  this	  year’.16	  These	  events	  were	  observed	  with	  mixed	  satisfaction	  and	  anxiousness	  in	  the	  Russian	   Caucasus,	   where	   newspapers	   closely	   followed	   developments	   in	   the	   field	   and	  were	  on	  the	  lookout	  for	  signs	  of	  invasion.17	  World	  War	  One,	  in	  this	  manner,	  started	  the	  process	  by	  which	  the	  locust	  began	  to	  be	  perceived	  as	  an	  alien	  threat	  coming	  from	  over	  the	  border.	  	  It	  was	  not	   incidentally	   that	   the	   International	  Agricultural	   Institute	  decided	   in	  1916	   to	  publish	   a	   handbook	  on	   locust	  management	   in	   several	   countries.18	  Even	   though	  Russia	  itself	  was	  not	  affected	  by	  the	  Year	  of	  the	  Locust,	  Caucasian	  authorities	  were	  sufficiently	  disquieted	  to	  order	  a	  reorganisation	  of	  the	  locust	  prevention	  system.	  Two	  Offices	  for	  the	  prevention	  of	  agricultural	  pests	  were	  created	   in	  1916,	  one	  based	   in	  Tiflis,	   the	  other	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  For	  debates	  on	  the	  locust	  annihilation	  bill	  (çekirge	  itlafı	  hakkında	  kanun	  layihası)	  see	  ‘Onsekizinci	  Inikad.	  7	  Haziran	  1330	  (1914)’,	  Meclisi	  Mebusan	  Zabıt	  Ceridesi,	  Term	  3,	  Year	  of	  Session	  1,	  Vol.	  1,	  TBMM	  Basımevi,	  1991,	  pp.	  388–90,	  also	  pp.	  225–39,	  247–8.	  	  14	  Kurt	  Floericke,	  Heuschrecken	  und	  Libellen	  (Stuttgart:	  Kosmos,	  1922)	  pp.	  9–10.	  15	  Ihsan	  et-­‐Tercüman,	  Çekirge	  yılı	  (Kudüs	  1915–1916)	  (Istanbul:	  Klasik	  Yayınları,	  2012).	  Original	  edition,	  Salim	  Tamari,	  Year	  of	  the	  Locust.	  A	  Soldier’s	  Diary	  and	  the	  Erasure	  of	  Palestine’s	  Ottoman	  Past	  (Berkeley;	  Los	  Angeles;	  London:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  2011);	  ‘Onbirinci	  Inikad.	  10	  Kanunevvel	  1331	  (1915)’,	  
Meclisi	  Mebusan	  Zabıt	  Ceridesi,	  Term	  3,	  Year	  of	  Session	  2,	  Vol.	  1,	  TBMM	  Basımevi,	  1991,	  p.	  214.	  	  16	  Cemal	  Paşa,	  Hatırât,	  Istanbul:	  Arma	  Yayınevi,	  1996,	  quoted	  in	  Hikmet	  Özdemir,	  The	  Ottoman	  Army	  
1914–1918.	  Disease	  and	  Death	  on	  the	  Battlefield	  (Salt	  Lake	  City:	  University	  of	  Utah	  Press,	  2008)	  p.	  156.	  	  17	  See	  for	  example,	  ‘Bor’ba	  s	  vrediteljami	  v	  Zakavkazje’,	  Kavkazskoe	  slovo	  122	  (31	  May	  -­‐13	  June	  1915):	  5.	  	  18	  Bureau	  des	  renseignements	  agricoles	  et	  des	  maladies	  des	  plantes,	  La	  lutte	  contre	  les	  sauterelles	  dans	  les	  
différents	  pays	  (Rome:	  Institut	  International	  d’Agriculture,	  1916).	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Baku.19 	  They	   concentrated	   both	   scientific	   and	   operational	   competences,	   and	   were	  expected	  to	  bridge	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  two	  dimensions,	  which	  had	  been	  criticised	  in	  the	  1910s.	  The	  Office	  notably	  tried	  to	  collect	  data	  on	  the	  historical	  cartography	  of	  the	  locust,	  to	   develop	   predictive	   capacities.	   It	   was	   also	   expected	   to	   propagate	   knowledge	   in	   the	  population	  with	   booklets,	   posters	   and	   a	   dedicated	  museum	  on	   agricultural	   pests.	   The	  war,	   however,	   left	   it	   with	   severely	   restricted	   means.	   The	   period	   of	   revolutions	   and	  independences	   in	   1917–1920	   witnessed	   a	   general	   collapse	   of	   agriculture	   and	   the	  economy	   at	   large.	   Procedures	   worked	   out	   to	   fight	   the	   locusts	   were	   almost	   entirely	  abandoned	  in	  view	  of	   the	  troubled	  political	  situation.	  Geographical	   factors	  contributed	  to	  this	  abandonment	  at	  the	  time	  of	  independences.	  Locusts	  were	  concentrated	  in	  steppe	  border	   areas	   between	   the	   three	   Caucasian	   republics	   and	   along	   the	   border	   with	   Iran,	  where	   military	   operations	   happened	   and	   insecurity	   was	   permanent,	   preventing	   anti-­‐acridian	  works.	  	  In	  April	  1920,	  as	  the	  Bolsheviks	  staged	  their	  coup	  in	  Azerbaijan,	  the	  economic	  situation	  of	  the	  country	  indicated	  a	  steep	  decline	  from	  the	  pre-­‐war	  levels.	  Livestock	  amounted	  to	  only	   sixty	   per	   cent	   of	  what	   it	   had	   been	   in	   1913.	   In	   the	  Mugan,	   a	  mere	   24	   out	   of	   150	  irrigation	  canals	  still	  worked.	  Slightly	  more	  than	  8,000	  desiatins	  were	  irrigated,	  against	  102,000	  in	  1913.20	  Civil	  war	  destruction	  and	  lack	  of	  maintenance	  combined	  with	  strong	  locust	   destruction.	   More	   than	   200,000	   desiatins	   fell	   prey	   to	   pests	   in	   1920	   in	   all	  Azerbaijan,	   especially	   in	   southern	   borderlands.	   The	   Azerbaijani	   Revolutionary	  Committee	  took	  swift	  measures	  against	  the	  locust	  pests,	  which	  threatened	  a	  new	  famine	  and	   a	   further	   decline	   of	   agricultural	   production.	   As	   Soviet	   Russia	   pressed	   the	   sister	  republic	   to	   supply	   it	   with	   food	   for	   starving	   Russians	   and	   Ukrainians,	   Azerbaijan	   was	  under	   great	   pressure.	   Soviet	   officials	   began	   to	   draft	   anti-­‐acridian	   plans	   at	   the	   end	   of	  1920.	   The	   Sovietisation	   of	   Armenia	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   December	   1920	   opened	   a	  tentative	   opportunity	   for	   cooperation	   but	   the	   protracted	   Dashnak	   insurrection	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Report	  on	  plant	  protection	  in	  Georgia,	  presented	  by	  Nagornyj,	  31	  Mar.	  1924,	  Trudy	  pervogo	  s’’ezda	  
Narkomzemov	  ZSFSR	  v	  gorode	  Tiflis,	  30	  marta-­‐5	  aprelja	  1924	  (Stenograficheskij	  otchet)	  (Tiflis:	  Izdanie	  Narkomzema	  Gruzii,	  1924)	  pp.	  3–4.	  	  20	  This	  Russian	  unit	  of	  measure	  progressively	  abandoned	  in	  the	  1920s	  was	  equal	  to	  2.7	  acres;	  Tretij	  Sozyv	  
Vseazerbajdzhanskogo	  s’’ezda	  Sovetov	  rabochikh,	  krest’janskikh,	  krasnoarmejskikh	  i	  matrosskikh	  deputatov.	  
Protokoly	  i	  strenograficheskij	  otchet,	  Baku,	  1924,	  pp.	  130–132;	  see	  also	  the	  report	  for	  the	  Council	  of	  Labour	  and	  Defence	  (STO),	  which	  established	  a	  general	  assessment	  of	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  early	  1920s	  in	  Southern	  Azerbaijan.	  Mikhail	  Avdeev,	  Mugan’	  i	  Sal’janskaja	  step’.Naselenie-­‐Zemlepol’zovanie-­‐Vodnoe	  khozjajstvo	  (Baku:	  Komissija	  po	  obsledovaniju	  Mugani,	  1927).	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Zangezur,	  the	  border	  region	  most	  concerned	  by	  the	  locusts,	  prevented	  cooperation	  until	  1922. 21 	  Even	   in	   later	   years,	   the	   internal	   administrative	   partition	   of	   the	   regions	  threatened	  by	  locusts	  would	  prove	  an	  occasional	  hurdle	  to	  well-­‐coordinated	  action.	  	  The	   Bolshevik	   reframing	   of	   locust	   pests	   as	   a	   foreign	   threat	   menacing	   Soviet	   borders	  merged	  two	  dimensions.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  was	  the	  evolution	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  to	  better	   grasp	   the	   migratory	   dimension	   of	   the	   locusts,	   its	   biological	   and	   ecological	  determinants	  and	  the	  peculiarities	  of	  each	  species	  within	  the	  Caelifera	  sub-­‐order.	  It	  was	  in	  1920–1921	  that	  the	  Russian	  émigré	  Uvarov	  submitted	  his	  first	  hypotheses	  on	  phase	  polymorphisms	   and	   determinants	   of	   locust	   migrations. 22 	  In	   October	   1920,	   the	  International	  Agricultural	  Institute	  staged	  its	  first	  international	  conference	  on	  interstate	  locust	   cooperation. 23 	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   ideology	   of	   war	   communism	   and	  bolshevism,	   which	   depicted	   Soviet	   Russia	   as	   a	   beleaguered	   country,	   integrated	   the	  locust	  factor	  in	  its	  rhetoric.	  Quite	  tellingly,	  a	  decree	  by	  the	  Azeri	  Sovnarkom	  proclaimed	  locust	  control	  a	  ‘military	  task’	  in	  October	  1921,	  in	  direct	  continuity	  from	  the	  civil	  war.24	  Science	  met	  politics	  to	  produce	  a	  different	  perception	  and	  new	  modes	  of	  managing	  the	  locust	  pests,	  clearly	  conceived	  as	  border	  problems.	  	  	  LOCUST	  CONTROL	  AND	  SOVIET	  MASS	  MOBILISATION	  Soviet	  locust	  management	  in	  the	  border	  republics	  of	  the	  Caucasus	  and	  Central	  Asia	  was	  tightly	   connected	   to	   the	   general	   project	   of	   transforming	   and	   modernising	   the	  countryside.	   Development	   was	   first	   and	   foremost	   an	   internal	   project.	   However,	  ecological	  interdependence	  meant	  all	  measures	  taken	  on	  Soviet	  soil	  could	  be	  reduced	  to	  nil	   if	   nothing	   was	   done	   in	   Iran.	   At	   the	   Iranian-­‐Azeri	   border,	   the	   Mugan	   steppe	  constituted	  an	  environmental	  unit	  divided	  by	  the	  border	  and	  numerous	   locusts	  nested	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  ‘Migliorata	  situazione	  economica	  in	  Armenia’,	  Oriente	  Moderno	  2	  /	  3,	  (Aug.	  1922):	  172.	  	  22	  Uvarov,	  ‘A	  revision	  of	  the	  genus	  Locusta,	  L.	  (=	  Pachytylus,	  Fieb.),	  with	  a	  new	  theory	  as	  to	  the	  periodicity	  and	  migrations	  of	  locusts’,	  Bulletin	  of	  Entomological	  Research	  12	  (1921):	  135–163.	  23	  Institut	  International	  d’Agriculture,	  Actes	  de	  la	  Conférence	  Internationale	  pour	  l’organisation	  de	  la	  lutte	  
contre	  les	  sauterelles	  (Rome,	  28–31	  octobre	  1920)	  (Rome:	  Institut	  International	  d’Agriculture,	  1921).	  24	  L.P.	  Semenov	  (ed.)	  Ocherk	  bor’by	  s	  sarancheiu	  v	  Azerbajdzhane	  i	  kampanija	  bor’by	  1921–1922	  g.	  (Baku:	  Narkomvnudel	  ASSR,	  1922)	  pp.	  42–4.	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in	   Persian	   Mugan. 25 	  Thus,	   mass	   mobilisation	   on	   the	   Soviet	   side	   of	   the	   border	  surreptitiously	  influenced	  developments	  in	  Iran	  in	  the	  early	  1920s.	  This	  influence	  could	  be	  felt	  during	  the	  entire	  process	  of	  locust	  control,	  which	  followed	  a	  similar	  pattern,	  year	  after	  year.	  	  In	   the	   Caucasus,	   Soviet	   Azerbaijan	   and	   Iranian	   border	   areas	   were	   the	   main	   regions	  concerned,	  even	  though	  Armenia	  and	  Georgia	  frequently	  had	  to	  tackle	  locust	  invasions.	  The	   year	   1924	   can	   serve	   as	   an	   example	   of	   the	   way	   locust	   campaigns	   unfolded.	   In	  September–November	   1923,	   expeditions	   were	   sent	   in	   southern	   and	   south-­‐western	  Azerbaijan,	   where	   locusts	   nested,	   to	   scout	   the	   countryside	   and	   localise	   locust	   podds,	  their	   concentration	   and	   all	   ecological	   factors	   which	   could	   be	   of	   interest.	   Whenever	  possible,	  teams	  were	  also	  dispatched	  to	  Persia,	   in	  order	  to	  reconnoitre	  border	  areas.	  If	  locusts	  could	  freely	  develop	  in	  the	  Persian	  Mugan,	  their	  later	  migration	  in	  spring	  would	  ruin	  all	  efforts	  undertaken	  on	  Soviet	  soil.	  The	  logic	  of	  biological	  units	  did	  not	  correspond	  to	  political	  borders	  and	  demanded	  cross-­‐border	  action.	  Intelligence	  was	  transmitted	  and	  concentrated	  in	  the	  Azeri	  Organisation	  for	  Plant	  Protection	  (OZRA)	  by	  December	  1923.	  The	  OZRA	  calculated	  the	  human,	  material	  and	  financial	  means	  needed	  to	  annihilate	  the	  locusts,	   on	   both	   Soviet	   and	   Persian	   soils.	   In	   early	   January	   1924,	   Bunyat-­‐Zade,	   Azeri	  Commissar	   for	   Agriculture,	   declared	   that	   100,000	   desiatins	   were	   contaminated	   and	  should	  be	  treated	  preventively.	  This	  was	  a	  huge	  area,	  and	  scheduled	  expenses	  reached	  200,000	   rubles	   for	   annihilation	   in	   Azerbaijan	   and	   100–150,000	   in	   Persia. 26 	  After	  complicated	   budgetary	   negotiations,	   the	   campaign	   to	   annihilate	   locust	   nests	   began	   in	  April,	  at	  the	  time	  when	  locust	  podds	  hatched.	  The	  campaign	  relied	  upon	  peasant	  forced	  work.	   They	   were	   engaged	   in	   mechanical	   destruction	   of	   podds	   and	   young	   locusts,	   by	  different	  means.	  As	  the	  1920s	  went	  on,	  they	  were	  increasingly	  supported	  by	  aeroplanes,	  used	   to	   spread	   poison	   and	   insecticides	   on	   contaminated	   areas.27 	  These	   works,	   if	  undertaken	  in	  time,	  could	  destroy	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  locusts.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  On	  this	  aspect,	  Ernst	  Eckenberger,	  Gliederung	  der	  Mugan-­‐,	  Mil-­‐	  und	  Karabachsteppe	  Transkaukasiens	  (Frankfurt	  an	  der	  Oder:	  Richard	  Rischke,	  1936);	  V.R.	  Volobuev,	  Mugan’	  i	  Sal’janskaja	  step’:	  pochvenno-­‐
meliorativnyj	  ocherk	  (Izdatel’stvo	  Akademii	  Nauk	  Azerbajdzhanskoj	  SSR,	  1951).	  	  26	  ‘Ocherednye	  zadachi	  Narkomzema	  (beseda	  s	  tov.	  Bunjat-­‐Zade)’,	  Bakinskij	  Rabochij	  7	  /	  1030,	  (10	  Jan.	  1924):	  3.	  	  27	  Letter	  from	  the	  Georgian	  OZRA	  to	  the	  Transcaucasian	  Sovnarkom,	  18	  Sept.	  1928,	  Sakartvelos	  uakhlesi	  
istoriis	  tsentraluri	  arkivi	  (Central	  State	  Archive	  for	  Contemporary	  History	  of	  Georgia,	  SUITsA),	  f.	  617,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  2361,	  ll.	  7–10.	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However,	  not	  all	  locust	  podds	  on	  Soviet	  land	  could	  be	  treated	  and	  exterminated,	  due	  to	  organisational	   and	   technical	   flaws.	  More	  problematic	   yet	  was	   the	  migration	  of	   locusts	  from	  across	  the	  border.	  These	  migrations	  were	  practically	  impossible	  to	  predict,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	   information	  exchange	  with	   the	  Persian	  government	  on	   the	  situation	   in	  central	  and	  southern	  Persia.	  Soviet	  officials	  and	  entomologists	  had	  reliable	  intelligence	  only	  about	  the	  limited	  border	  strip	  they	  could	  explore	  themselves,	  about	  twenty	  versts	  into	  Iranian	  territory.	  There	  was	  thus	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  uncertainty	  in	  their	  action.28	  All	  of	  a	  sudden,	   swarms	   of	   locusts	   could	   cross	   the	   border,	   in	   the	  Mugan	   steppe	   or	  westward	  along	   the	   Arax	   river.	   The	   Soviet	   regime	   had	   now	   to	   carry	   on	  with	   a	   different	   type	   of	  action,	   a	   type	   in	  which	   it	  was	  elsewhere	  well	   experienced,	   a	   short-­‐term	  high-­‐intensity	  campaign,	  whose	   aim	  was	   to	   stop	   the	   invasion.29	  Whereas	   the	   first	   type	   of	   campaign,	  exterminating	  eggs	  and	  young	   locusts,	  was	  expensive	  and	   time-­‐consuming,	   the	  second	  phase	  involved	  fighting	  and	  killing	  adult	  locusts	  in	  a	  context	  of	  general	  panic.	  Depending	  on	   their	   species,	   adult	   locusts	   can	   exceed	   twenty	   centimetres	   in	   length.	   They	   are	  particularly	  voracious	  and	  able	  to	  ravage	  an	  entire	  field	  in	  a	  few	  minutes.	  	  Soviet	   authorities	   partially	   fostered	   this	   fear,	   in	   order	   to	   mobilise	   and	   unite	   the	  population	   around	   the	   state	   and	   Party.	   An	   example	   is	   the	   newspaper	   Kommunist’s	  headline	  on	  14	  May	  1924,	  when	  the	  invasion	  from	  Persia	  was	  announced.	  A	  giant	  locust,	  standing	   on	   its	   hind	   legs,	   threatened	   the	   reader	   with	   a	   scythe	   featuring	   skulls	   and	  crossbones.	  Vultures	  hovered	  over	  the	  desert	  steppe	  that	  stretched	  in	  the	  background.	  A	  single	  word	   topped	   this	   cartoon:	   ‘The	   locusts!’.30	  The	   article	   that	   followed,	   entitled‘On	  the	   locust	   front’,	   offered	   an	   example	   of	   communist	   zeal	   and	   diligence	   in	   the	   figure	   of	  comrade	   Ibrahimov,	  who	   supervised	   the	   struggle	   in	   the	  Ağdam	   region.	   The	   campaign	  then	   went	   on	   with	   tens	   of	   thousands	   peasants	   mobilised	   at	   its	   peak,	   even	   though	  desertion	   was	   rife.	   Instructors	   from	   the	   OZRA	   supervised	   the	   work,	   helped	   by	   local	  officials	  and	  policemen.	   In	   June	  1924,	  Bunyat-­‐Zade	   toured	   the	  districts	  affected	  by	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Forecasting	  migrant	  insect	  pests	  remains	  an	  important	  problem	  in	  many	  regions:	  see	  R.K.	  Day	  and	  J.D.	  Knight	  ‘Operational	  Aspects	  of	  Forecasting	  Migrant	  Insect	  Pests’,	  in	  V.A.	  Drake	  and	  A.G.	  Gatehouse	  (eds)	  
Insect	  Migration.	  Tracking	  Resources	  through	  Space	  and	  Time,	  pp.	  323–34	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1995);	  I.P.	  Woiwod,	  D.R.	  Reynolds	  and	  C.D.	  Thomas,	  ‘Introduction	  and	  Overview’,	  in	  I.P.	  Woiwod,	  D.R.	  Reynolds	  and	  C.D.	  Thomas	  (eds)	  Insect	  Movement:	  Mechanisms	  and	  Consequences,	  pp.	  1–18	  (Wallingford;	  New	  York:	  CABI	  Publishing,	  2001).	  29	  Peter	  Kenez,	  The	  Birth	  of	  the	  Propaganda	  State.	  Soviet	  Methods	  of	  Mass	  Mobilisation,	  1917–1929	  (Cambridge;	  New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1985).	  	  30	  ‘Çekirtge	  cebhesinde’,	  Kommunist	  104	  /	  1104	  (14	  May	  1924):	  1.	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locust,	   meting	   out	   punishments	   and	   awards.31	  For	   Azeri	   leaders,	   the	   locust	   campaign	  was	   an	  occasion	   to	   turn	   to	   the	  masses	   and	   the	   countryside,	   as	   current	   slogans	  had	   it.	  Mechanical	   means	   such	   as	   extermination	   by	   fumigation,	   poisoned	   baits,	   water	   canals	  where	   locusts	   were	   trapped	   and	   metal	   boards	   were	   still	   overwhelmingly	   used.	  Newspapers	   followed	   day	   after	   day	   the	   progress	   of	   anti-­‐acridian	   works	   and	   offered	  numerous	  articles.	  The	  Transcaucasian	  government	  and	  Regional	  Party	  Committee	  also	  received	  secret	  reports	  on	  the	  situation.	  	  Despite	   the	   traditional	   character	  of	   fighting	  methods	   implemented	   in	   the	  early	  1920s,	  the	  use	  of	  aeroplanes	  and	  new	  insecticides	  was	  the	  object	  of	  hot	  debate	  in	  the	  late	  1920s	  and	   early	   1930s.	   Aeroplanes	   had	   numerous	   supporters,	  who	   stuck	   to	   almost	   political	  rationales	  for	  legitimating	  their	  use.	  An	  aircraft	  was	  a	  symbol	  of	  modernity,	  coterminous	  with	   efficiency. 32 	  All-­‐out	   use	   of	   aircraft	   was	   a	   stimulus	   to	   industrialisation	   and	  simultaneously	  served	  defence	  purposes.	  In	  this	  border	  region,	  who	  could	  have	  doubted	  that	   planes	   were	   double-­‐use,	   since	   they	   enabled	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   to	   undertake	  reconnaissance	   work	   in	   Persia	   over	   the	   border.	   The	   use	   of	   aircraft	   for	   operations	   in	  Persia	   itself	  was	  at	   first	   rejected	  by	  Persian	  officials	  and	   incidents	  still	  happened,	  well	  into	  the	  1930s.	  However,	  some	  opponents	  noted	  that	  planes	  were	  definitely	  not	  a	  cure-­‐all.	   Ideology	  should	  not	  blind	  practicality	  and	  planes	  could	  not	  be	  used	  everywhere.	   In	  the	  Persian	  part	  of	  the	  Mugan,	  the	  steep	  and	  rugged	  landscape	  caused	  heavy	  waste	  when	  planes	  spread	  pesticides.	  The	  weather	  sometimes	  prevented	  them	  from	  taking	  off,	  when	  haze	  or	  sand	  storms	  set	  in.	  If	  no	  back-­‐up	  option	  had	  been	  prepared,	  the	  expedition	  was	  left	  powerless.	  The	  use	  of	  insecticide,	  pesticide	  and	  poisoned	  baits	  did	  not	  raise	  so	  much	  passion	  and	  was	  not	  much	  debated.	  However,	  one	   could	  note,	  now	  and	   then,	   remarks	  about	  the	  potential	  danger	  of	  indiscriminately	  using	  poisoned	  substances.	  Paris	  green,	  a	  copper	  and	  arsenic	  compound,	  was	  a	   favourite	  among	  Soviet	  officials,	  but	   could	  cause	  severe	  water	  pollution	  and	  destruction	  of	  vegetation.33	  As	   in	  other	  parts	  of	   the	  Middle	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31‘Bor’ba	  s	  saranchej’,	  Bakinskij	  Rabochij	  103	  /	  1126	  (9	  May	  1924):	  3;	  ‘Polnyj	  uspekh	  bor’by	  na	  saranchevom	  fronte’,	  Bakinskij	  Rabochij	  128	  /	  1151	  (9	  June	  1924):	  1.	  	  32	  On	  the	  question	  of	  innovation	  and	  efficiency,	  with	  the	  sometimes	  higher	  efficiency	  of	  older	  instruments,	  see	  David	  Edgerton,	  The	  Shock	  of	  the	  Old:	  Technology	  and	  Global	  History	  since	  1900	  (London:	  Profile	  Books,	  2006),	  passim;	  a	  glimpse	  in	  the	  Soviet	  public	  stance	  in	  OBV,	  Aviatsija	  v	  bor’be	  s	  vrediteljami	  sel’skogo	  i	  
lesnogo	  khozjajstva	  (Moscow:	  Sel’khozgiz,	  1932).	  	  33	  N.A.	  Kholodkovskij,	  Kurs	  entomologii	  teoreticheskoj	  i	  prikladnoj,	  Vol.	  2,	  pp.	  66–7	  (Moscow:	  Gosizdatel’stvo,	  1929).	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East,	   peasants’	   complaints	   often	   lay	   at	   the	   basis	   of	   such	   qualms.34	  Some	   institutions	  suggested	  that	  massive	  recourse	  to	  pesticide	  was	  evidence	  of	  the	  deficiencies	  of	  Soviet	  applied	  science,	  which	  had	  not	  been	  able	  to	  devise	  ‘intelligent’	  remedies.35	  Each	   year,	   a	   decree	  was	   adopted	   by	   the	   Transcaucasian	   Central	   Executive	   Committee	  and	  Sovnarkom	  to	  appoint	  a	  locust-­‐struggle	  plenipotentiary,	  which	  was	  then	  confirmed	  by	  republican	  authorities.	  The	  decree	  was	  usually	  stern	  and	  martial	  in	  tone,	  pointing	  to	  the	  tremendous	  danger	  set	  by	  locusts	  in	  the	  region.	  The	  plenipotentiary	  had	  very	  broad	  competences,	  which	  embraced	  general	  police	   for	   the	   time	  of	   the	   campaign	   in	  districts	  concerned.	  He	  wielded	  wide	  powers	  in	  the	  administrative	  and	  political	  apparatus	  itself.	  When	   Erzinkjan,	   Transcaucasian	   People’s	   Commissar	   for	   Agriculture,	   was	   appointed	  plenipotentiary	  in	  1930,	  he	  could	  Submit	  to	  administrative	  measures,	  arrest	  and	  bring	  to	  trial	  all	  officials,	  guilty	  of	  untimely	  or	  inaccurate	  completion	  of	  his	  orders,	  or	  having	  tolerated	  deficiencies	  of	   any	   kind,	   likely	   to	   have	   an	   impact	   on	   the	   success	   of	   the	   antiacridian	  campaign.36	  Such	   exorbitant	   powers	  were	   necessitated	   by	   the	   disparate	   interests	   of	   local	   officials,	  who	  tried	  to	  defend	  above	  all	  their	  own	  districts,	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  general	  coherence	  of	  the	   campaign.	   The	   fact	   that	   locust	   destruction	   threatened	   an	   inability	   to	   fulfil	   grain	  requirements	   and	   production	   targets	   played	   no	   small	   role	   in	   this	   occasional	  unwillingness	   to	   implement	   central	   decisions,	   whenever	   they	   contradicted	   local	  interests.	  In	  Azerbaijan,	  the	  first	  plenipotentiary	  appointed	  in	  February	  1922,	  Mir	  Djafar	  Bagirov,	  was	  the	  head	  of	  the	  local	  Cheka,	  and	  used	  this	  position	  in	  order	  to	  tighten	  his	  grip	  on	  countryside	  officials,	  as	  he	  was	  already	  busy	  building	  his	  own	  power	  base	  before	  becoming	   first	   secretary	   of	   the	   Azery	   Communist	   Party	   from	   1938	   to	   1953.37	  Major	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  For	  such	  complaints	  about	  cattle	  losses	  due	  to	  poisoned	  grain	  in	  Iran,	  see	  Sir	  G.A.	  Richardson,	  Report	  on	  
the	  Current	  Locust	  Situation	  in	  the	  Bandar	  Abbas	  District	  up	  to	  May	  1930,	  28	  June	  1930,	  NHMA,	  AL2/100.	  	  35	  See	  the	  veiled	  criticism	  of	  the	  Transcaucasian	  representation	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  Transcaucasian	  government,	  6	  June	  1928,	  SUITsA,	  f.	  617,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  2203,	  ll.	  1–3.	  	  36	  Protocol	  No.	  25,	  Session	  of	  the	  Transcaucasian	  Central	  Executive	  Committee’s	  Presidium,	  3	  June	  1930,	  SUITsA,	  f.	  607,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  2616,	  l.	  3.	  	  37	  See	  the	  protocol	  of	  the	  Azrevkom,	  13	  Feb.	  1922,	  reproduced	  in	  Atakhan	  Paşaev	  (ed.)	  Azerbaycan	  inqilab	  
komitesi	  ve	  xalq	  komissarları	  Sovet	  iclaslarının	  protokolları	  (1920–1922ci	  iller)	  (Baku,	  Azerbaycan	  Respublikasinin	  Milli	  Arxiv	  Idaresi/Çaşıoğlu	  neşriyyatı,	  2009)	  pp.	  352–355;	  on	  Bagirov’s	  position	  at	  the	  time	  and	  personal	  ties	  with	  Beria,	  see	  Amy	  Knight,	  Beria.	  Stalin’s	  First	  Lieutenant	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1993)	  pp.	  19–23.	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political	   players	   were	   conscious	   of	   the	   profits	   they	   could	   draw	   from	   the	   locust	  campaigns.	  	  Coercion	   associated	   with	   anti-­‐acridian	   operations	   was	   a	   very	   effective	   but	   not	   much	  advertised	   aspect	   of	   these	   campaigns.	   Rather,	   Soviet	   officials	  were	   fond	   of	   presenting	  locust-­‐fighting	  as	  a	  central	  element	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  in	  the	  region.	  As	  M.S.	  Ordubadi,	  an	   editor	   of	   Kommunist	  wrote:	   ‘Azeri	   peasants	   should	   unite	   around	   state	   institutions	  and	   deal	   a	   decisive	   stroke	   to	   the	   enemy’.38	  A	   central	   problem	   in	   this	   respect	  was	   the	  resort	   to	   unpaid	   labour	   for	   preventive	   and	   reactive	   operations.	   Despite	   strong	  repudiations,	   Azeri	   officials	   were	   conscious	   that	   resort	   to	   unpaid	   labour	  (trudguzhpovinnost’),	   by	   nature	   a	   form	   of	   tax,	   was	   unpopular	   among	   peasants	   in	   the	  border	   regions.39	  In	   1925,	   a	   harsh	   winter	   and	   natural	   catastrophies	   forced	   them	   to	  renounce	   unpaid	   labour	   so	   as	   to	   avoid	   an	   all-­‐out	   rebellion.40	  Mustafa	   Chokaev,	   a	  nationalist	   emigré	   from	   Central	   Asia,	   termed	   unpaid	   work	   in	   cotton	   fields	   a	   modern	  serfdom.	   It	   appeared	   as	   a	   remnant	   of	   the	   Ancien	   Régime	   and	   Soviet	   authorities	  were	  keen	  to	  justify	  it	  by	  clearly	  linking	  it	  to	  environmental	  issues.	  A	  rational	  discourse	  was	  developed	  to	  legitimate	  collective	  voluntary	  work	  in	  order	  to	  master	  natural	  challenges,	  such	  as	  floods,	  pests,	  diseases	  or	  earthquakes.	  As	  all	  of	  these	  natural	  hazards	  happened	  in	   the	   region,	   they	  were	   lumped	   together	   in	   a	   depiction	   of	   nature	   as	   an	   enemy	   to	   be	  defeated,	  along	  with	  Dashnaks,	  imperialists	  and	  others.	  Whereas	  Ancien	  Régime	  corvée	  embodied	  exploitation,	  Bolshevik	  corvée	  originated	  in	  natural	  constraints.41	  The	  chronic	  deficit	   in	  workforce	  was	   also	  mentioned	   in	   secret	   reports.42	  Discontent	   seems	   to	  have	  risen	   after	   collectivisation.	   In	   1930	   and	   1931,	   the	   Azeri	   and	   Transcaucasian	  Narkomzems	  militated	  in	  favour	  of	  paying	  the	  local	  labourers,	  to	  avoid	  serious	  unrest.	  It	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Elmar	  Magerramov,	  Gazeta	  Kommunist	  i	  voprosy	  vosstanovlenija	  sel’skogo	  khozjajstva	  (Baku:	  Nurlan,	  2004)	  p.	  242.	  	  39	  Alexis	  Berelovitch	  and	  V.	  Danilov,	  Sovetskaja	  derevnja	  glazami	  VChK-­‐OGPU-­‐NKVD,	  1918–1939,	  Vol.:	  
1918–1922	  (Moscow:	  ROSSPEN,	  2000)	  p.	  630.	  	  40	  Letter	  from	  the	  Azeri	  Sovnarkom	  to	  the	  Transcaucasian	  Sovnarkom,	  30	  Mar.	  1925,	  SUITsA,	  f.	  617,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  468,	  l.	  26.	  	  41	  For	  global	  comparisons	  and	  insights	  on	  the	  problem	  of	  forced	  labour,	  see	  Alessandro	  Stanziani	  (ed.)	  Le	  
Travail	  contraint	  en	  Asie	  et	  en	  Europe,	  XVIIe-­‐XXe	  siècles	  (Paris:	  Editions	  de	  la	  MSH,	  2010);	  see	  also	  Martin	  Thomas,	  Violence	  and	  Colonial	  Order.	  Police,	  Workers	  and	  Protest	  in	  the	  European	  Colonial	  Empires,	  1918–
1940	  (Cambridge-­‐New	  York:	  CUP,	  2012)	  pp.	  20–23	  and	  passim.	  	  42	  It	  was	  estimated	  in	  1930	  that	  52,850	  people	  were	  available	  for	  collective	  works	  in	  Mugan,	  with	  a	  deficit	  of	  around	  24,000	  people.	  Report	  of	  the	  special	  commission	  on	  the	  water	  problem	  in	  Mugan	  to	  the	  Azeri	  Sovnarkom,	  undated	  (June-­‐July	  1930),	  SUITsA,	  f.	  617,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  117,	  l.	  10.	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asked	   for	   500,000	   rubles	   in	   addition	   to	   the	  1.2	  million	   rubles	   already	   granted	   for	   the	  locust	   campaign,	  but	   the	  Transcaucasian	  Commissariat	   for	  Finance	   turned	   the	   request	  down	  on	  budgetary	  grounds.43	  	  Locust	  campaigns	  were	  concentrated	  in	  time,	  but	  they	  came	  with	  permanent	  measures	  to	  educate	  the	  population.	  In	  almost	  all	  Eurasian	  cultures,	  locusts	  evoked	  religious	  and	  superstitious	  reactions.44	  These	  reactions	  did	  not	  necessarily	  hinder	  pragmatic	  steps	  to	  fight	   the	   locusts,	   but	   sometimes	   produced	   seemingly	   irrational	   behaviours	   in	   the	  peasant	  population.	  In	  Russia,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  church	  was	  the	  main	  refuge	  in	  the	  face	  of	  locust	  invasions.	  Well	  into	  the	  1920s,	  Russian	  peasants	  would	  ask	  the	  local	  pope	  to	  pray	  and	   deflect	   the	   invasion,	  much	   to	   the	   outrage	   of	   Soviet	   officials.45	  In	   the	  Middle	   East,	  especially	  in	  Turkish	  and	  Persian-­‐speaking	  areas	  from	  Eastern	  Anatolia	  to	  Afghanistan,	  superstition	   and	   folk	   customs	   thrived	   on	   locust-­‐impelled	   terror.	   There	   existed,	   as	   the	  story	  went,	  a	  miraculous	  spring	  in	  Eastern	  Iran,	  probably	  Khorasan.	  If	  a	  particular	  bird	  drank	  the	  water	  taken	  from	  this	  spring,	  called	  ‘locust	  water’	  (âb-­‐i	  malakh),	   it	  would	  be	  converted	  into	  a	  ravenous	  locust-­‐killer.46	  In	  times	  of	  invasion,	  peasants	  would	  strive	  to	  get	   this	   water	   by	   all	   means.	   This	   medieval	   tradition	   was	   still	   very	   lively	   in	   early	  twentieth	  century	  Transcaucasia.	  For	  Soviet	  officials,	  it	  posed	  a	  threat	  as	  it	  maintained	  a	  link	   with	   the	   Iranian	   cultural	   area	   and	   Islamic	   traditions.	   The	   locusts	   thus	   gave	   an	  opportunity	   to	   push	   forward	   the	   struggle	   against	   superstition	   in	   the	   local	   population.	  Soviet	   officials	   expected	   that	   a	   success	   in	   locust	   management	   would	   be	   a	   sufficient	  miracle	  to	  convert	  the	  population	  to	  communism.	  They	  had	  their	  own	  holy	  texts	  in	  the	  form	  of	  an	  abundant	  literature,	  both	  in	  Russian	  and	  Azeri,	  concerning	  the	  scientific	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Letter	  from	  the	  Narkomzem	  ZSFSR	  to	  the	  Transcaucasian	  Sovnarkom,	  31	  Jan.	  1931,	  and	  answer	  from	  the	  Narkomfin	  ZSFSR	  to	  the	  Transcaucasian	  Sovnarkom,	  SUITsA,	  f.	  617,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  5601,	  ll.	  3–4.	  and	  8.	  	  44	  For	  the	  Chinese	  case,	  see	  Raimund	  Theodor	  Kolb,	  Die	  ostasiatische	  Wanderheuschrecke	  und	  ihre	  
Bekämpfung	  unter	  besondered	  Berücksichtigung	  der	  Ming-­‐	  und	  Qing-­‐Zeit	  (1368–1911)	  (Heidelberg,	  Edition	  Forum,	  1996);	  and	  Yu	  Rongliang,	  ‘Woguo	  lishishang	  dui	  zuowubingchonghai	  de	  yaowufangzhi	  gaikuang’	  [我國歷史上對作物病蟲害的藥物防治概況],	  Nongye	  kaogu	  [农业	  考古]	  1	  (1983):	  212–221.	  	  45	  A	  literary	  example	  of	  this	  popular	  mysticism	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  the	  locust	  can	  be	  found	  in	  R.	  Berezov	  and	  A.	  Glagolev,	  O	  popovskoj	  zabote,	  o	  saranche	  i	  o	  samolete	  (Moscow,	  ODVF,	  1925),	  quoted	  in	  Scott	  W.	  Palmer,	  Dictatorship	  of	  the	  Air:	  Aviation	  Culture	  and	  the	  Fate	  of	  Modern	  Russia	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2006)	  pp.	  131–134.	  	  46	  The	  bird	  in	  question	  was	  the	  rose	  coloured	  pastor	  (pastor	  roseus),	  according	  to	  Jean	  Deny,	  ‘La	  légende	  de	  “l’eau	  des	  sauterelles’’	  et	  de	  l’oiseau	  qui	  détruit	  ces	  insectes’,	  Revue	  asiatique,	  (Apr.-­‐June	  1933):	  323–340.	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modern	  approach	   to	   the	   locust.47	  Newspapers	  were	   also	   active	   in	  popular	   agricultural	  education.	   Interestingly,	   the	   Azeri-­‐language	   newspaper	   Kommunist	   devoted	   far	   more	  space	   to	   agriculture	   than	   the	   Russian-­‐language	   official	   newspaper	   in	   Azerbaijan,	   the	  
Baku	  Worker.48	  	  	  FROM	  INTERNAL	  DEVELOPMENT	  TO	  CROSS-­‐BORDER	  AID	  Locust	  management	  stood	  at	  the	  middle	  of	  debates	  related	  both	  to	  this	  internal	  process	  of	   socio-­‐economic	   modernisation	   and	   issues	   of	   international	   cooperation.	   The	  republican	   and	   Transcaucasian	   budgets,	   chronically	   cash-­‐stripped,	   relied	   heavily	   on	  financial	   transfers	   from	   the	   centre	   to	   finance	   anti-­‐acridian	   campaigns.	   The	   yearly	  variations	  in	  the	  level	  of	  locust	  contamination	  and	  migrations	  created	  a	  serious	  problem	  in	  budgetary	  planning.	  Additional	  credits	  were	  demanded	  by	  Transcaucasian	  authorities	  as	   soon	   as	   the	   first	   estimates	   about	   soil	   contamination	   were	   available,	   in	   January-­‐February	  each	  year.	  On	  21	  January	  1930,	  for	   instance,	  the	  Georgian	  Narkomzem	  asked	  for	  80,000	  rubles,	  in	  addition	  of	  the	  30,000	  it	  already	  had	  for	  locust	  management.49	  The	  argument	  for	  demanding	  federal	  support	  was	  twofold.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Transcaucasian	  leaders	  argued	  that	  the	  Caucasus	  was	  part	  of	  the	  Soviet	  agricultural	  border	  system	  and	  that	   it	   prevented,	   by	   its	   action	   against	   the	   locusts	   in	   the	   borderlands,	   continental	  invasion	  further	  into	  Russia.	  An	  action	  that	  benefited	  all	  Soviet	  republics	  should	  logically	  be	   centrally-­‐funded.	   The	   ZSFSR	   also	   backed	   requests	   lodged	   by	   Turkmenistan	   and	  Uzbekistan	  for	  federal	  support	  of	  their	  own	  locust	  campaigns.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  was	  noted	  that,	  since	  Transcaucasia	  grew	  valuable	  crops	  that	  were	  processed	  elsewhere	   in	  USSR,	  its	  agriculture	  was	  a	  state	  concern	  and	  should	  be	  protected	  by	  Moscow.	  Both	  as	  a	  border	  region	  and	  a	  subtropical	  basis	  the	  ZSFSR	  should	  be	  shielded	  from	  the	  locust	  pest,	  at	   the	   central	   government’s	   cost.	   These	   arguments	   were	   replicated	   by	   Azerbaijan,	  Georgia	   and	   Armenia	   in	   their	   negotiations	   with	   Tiflis.	   Republics	   generally	   obtained	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  As	  soon	  as	  spring	  1921,	  a	  seven-­‐page	  bilingual	  booklet	  was	  edited	  containing	  instructions	  on	  locust	  fighting:	  Çekirtge	  zerervericileri	  ile	  mübarize	  telimatı,	  Baku,	  Başsiyasimaarif’in	  neşriyyat	  texnika	  bölmesinin	  neşri,	  1921.	  	  48	  Elmar	  Məәhəәrrəәmov,	  Xalq	  Qəәzeti	  yaranması	  vəә	  inkişafı	  tarixinden	  (Baku:	  Elm	  vəә	  təәhsil,	  2009)	  pp.	  50–58	  and	  75.	  	  49	  Letter	  from	  the	  Georgian	  Sovnarkom	  to	  the	  Transcaucasian	  Sovnarkom,	  21	  Jan.	  1930,	  SUITsA,	  f.	  617,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  4979,	  ll.	  1–2.	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additional	  means,	   though	   not	   to	   the	   level	   they	   expected.	   The	   situation	  was	   especially	  difficult	  in	  1929–1931,	  when	  credits	  were	  sometimes	  refused	  outright.50	  	  In	  the	  first	  three	  years	  after	  Sovietisation,	  until	  1923,	  Azerbaijan	  was	  so	  destitute	  that	  all	  costs	  for	  the	  locust	  campaign	  were	  borne	  by	  the	  Russian	  Narkomzem.	  This	  led	  to	  heavy	  complications,	   as	   machinery	   and	   insecticides	   were	   bought	   in	   Russia	   then	   shipped	   to	  Azerbaijan,	   causing	   serious	   delays.	   Organisational	   problems	   piled	   up,	   since	   financial	  networks	  had	  barely	  recovered	  and	  transfers	  took	  time.	  Transcaucasian	  authorities	  had	  to	  send	  special	  emissaries	  to	  Moscow	  to	  quicken	  the	  pace.51	  The	  locusts	  were	  admittedly	  a	   sound	   justification	   to	   get	   fast	   money.	   However,	   Moscow	   authorities	   obviously	  suspected	   Transcaucasian	   leaders	   of	   overdoing	   it	   and	   inflating	   the	   amounts	   required.	  Georgia	  was	   especially	   distrusted,	   since	   it	  was	   irregularly	   stricken	   by	   the	   locusts	   and	  could	  not	  provide	  consistent	  statistics	  on	  its	  financial	  needs.52	  Moscow	  top	  officials	  also	  bore	   in	  mind	   the	   trial	   organised	   in	   summer	   1923,	   where	   thirteen	   top	   officials	   of	   the	  Azeri	   anti-­‐locust	  organisation	  had	  been	   condemned	   for	   embezzling	   the	   funds	   lavished	  on	   the	   locust	   campaign	   by	   the	   Russian	   Narkomzem.53	  True,	   Transcaucasian	   leaders	  could	   have	   answered	   that	   the	   accused	  were	   predominantly	   Russian.	   The	   Azeri	   OZRA	  was	  in	  a	  permanent	  situation	  of	  indebtedness,	  due	  to	  the	  expenses	  it	  had	  to	  bear	  before	  it	   was	   established	   they	   would	   be	   covered	   by	   central	   subsidies.	   This	   created	   complex	  situations,	   as	   the	   State	   Bank	  would	   refuse	   to	   lend	  more	  money	   to	   the	  OZRA	  unless	   it	  repaid	  accumulated	  debts.54	  	  In	  parallel	  with	  intra-­‐federal	  negotiations	  and	  conflicts,	  the	  Soviet	  locust	  campaign	  also	  involved	  operations	  led	  on	  Iranian	  soil.	  Soviet	  requests	  for	  cooperation	  were	  generally	  turned	  down	  in	  the	  early	  1920s	  and	  only	  very	  limited	  actions	  could	  be	  performed.	  1924	  marked	  a	  clear	  transformation,	  with	  claims	  by	  Azeri	  institutions	  about	  the	  necessity	  to	  push	  the	  locust	  campaign	  beyond	  the	  border,	  since	  Iranian	  territory	  was	  a	  major	  host	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  In	  the	  case	  referred	  to	  above,	  the	  Georgian	  Commissariat	  for	  Agriculture	  was	  asked	  to	  displace	  funds	  from	  a	  budgetary	  title	  to	  another	  to	  meet	  locust	  expenses.	  SUITsA,	  f.	  617,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  4979,	  ll.	  5,8	  and	  12.	  	  51	  Letter	  from	  the	  Azeri	  Narkomzem	  to	  the	  Transcaucasian	  Narkomzem,	  5	  Feb.	  1923,	  SUITsA,	  f.	  607,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  22,	  ll.	  1–2.	  	  52	  Letter	  from	  the	  Georgian	  Sovnarkom	  to	  the	  Transcaucasian	  Sovnarkom,	  9	  June	  1928,	  SUITsA,	  f.	  617,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  2426,	  l.	  2	  ;	  Letter	  from	  the	  Georgian	  OZRA	  to	  the	  Transcaucasian	  Sovnarkom,	  18	  Sept.	  1928,	  SUITsA,	  f.	  617,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  2361,	  ll.	  7–10.	  	  53	  ‘Delo	  saranchevoj	  organizatsii’,	  Zarja	  Vostoka	  163	  /	  328,	  (18	  July	  1923):	  4.	  	  54	  Letter	  from	  the	  Azeri	  Narkomzem	  Vezirov	  to	  the	  Transcaucasian	  Sovnarkom,	  23	  Feb.	  1931,	  SUITsA,	  f.	  617,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  5601,	  l.	  22.	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locusts.55	  The	  locust	  campaign,	  from	  now	  on,	  was	  not	  only	  an	  internal	  border	  issue,	  but	  also	   an	   international	   one.	   Small	   expeditions	   were	   sent	   to	   Iran	   in	   the	   reconnaissance	  phase.	   In	   February,	   the	  plenipotentiary	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Commissariat	   for	   Foreign	  Affairs	  entered	  into	  diplomatic	  contacts	  with	  the	  Persian	  government	  to	  negotiate	  entry	  for	  the	  anti-­‐acridian	  expedition	  itself.56	  It	  was	  generally	  sent	  for	  a	  month	  or	  two	  to	  the	  border	  region,	   but	   schedules	   could	   vary	   abruptly.	   In	   1926,	   45	   Soviet	   technicians	   and	   experts	  were	   sent,	   coordinating	   the	   work	   of	   thirteen	   brigades	   with	   eleven	   men	   each.	   The	  expedition	  enjoyed	  the	  support	  of	  several	  vehicles,	  though	  not	  as	  many	  as	  expected,	  due	  to	  the	  reluctance	  of	  Armenia	  to	  provide	  some	  of	  its	  own.	  However,	  the	  expedition	  could	  act	   only	   in	   a	   limited	   thirty-­‐verst	   strip.	   This	  was	   better	   than	   the	   ten	   to	   thirteen	   versts	  conceded	  in	  earlier	  years,	  but	  Soviet	  experts	  considered	  their	  work	  would	  become	  really	  useful	  only	   if	   they	  could	  penetrate	  200–250	  versts	   into	   Iranian	  territory.57	  As	  a	  whole,	  20,000	  hectares	  were	  treated	  in	  Iran	  in	  1926	  and	  the	  estimated	  budget	  for	  locust	  works	  in	  this	  country	  reached	  279,000	  rubles.	  The	  situation	  was	  the	  reverse	  of	  normal	  years,	  when	   the	   majority	   of	   works	   were	   completed	   on	   Soviet	   soil.58	  Bankrolling	   the	   locust	  campaign	   in	   Iran	   was	   a	   financial	   problem,	   since	   it	   involved	   finding	   hard	   currency,	  generally	  dollars	  or	  gold-­‐rubles,	  to	  pay	  local	  expenses.59	  	  Cooperating	  with	  Persia	  on	   the	   locust	  pest	  meant	   transfers	  at	  more	   than	   the	  practical	  level	   of	   extermination	   campaigns.	   It	   was	   also	   an	   opportunity	   to	   gain	   influence	   in	   the	  budding	   milieu	   of	   Iranian	   agricultural	   entrepreneurs,	   administrators	   and	   scientists,	  where	  Westernising	   influences	  were	   strong.	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  was	   to	  propose	   its	  own	  model	  for	  development.	  Since	  Iranian	  intellectual	  elites	  attributed	  a	  great	  importance	  to	  the	   practical	   utility	   of	   knowledge,	   fighting	   against	   agricultural	   pests	  was	   a	   favourable	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Vtoroj	  Zakavkazskij	  s’’ezd	  Sovetov	  4–7	  janvarja	  1924.	  Stenograficheskij	  otchet,	  Tiflis,	  ZakTsIK,	  1924,	  p.	  171;	  ‘1928-­‐inci	  ilde	  A.S.Ş.	  cumhuriyeti	  çegirqe	  eleyhine	  mubareze	  işleri’,	  Iktisadi	  Habəәrləәr	  12	  /	  118,	  (Dec.	  1928):	  71–72.	  	  56	  Draft	  decision	  of	  the	  Transcaucasian	  Sovnarkom	  on	  the	  locust	  campaign,	  11	  Feb.	  1933,	  SUITsA,	  f.	  617,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  6657,	  ll.	  1–2.	  	  57	  Report	  from	  the	  Azeri	  OZRA	  to	  the	  Azeri	  Narkomzem,	  25	  Feb.	  1926,	  SUITsA,	  f.	  617,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  890,	  l.	  8;	  see	  also	  Yaşar	  Abdullaev,	  ‘ZSFSR	  v	  razvitii	  sovetsko-­‐iranskikh	  otnoshenij	  (1922–1928	  gg.)’	  (Ph.D.	  Thesis,	  Baku,	  AN	  ASSR-­‐Institut	  Vostokovedenija,	  1986),	  pp.	  136–7.	  	  58	  Letter	  from	  the	  Azeri	  Sovnarkom	  to	  the	  Transcaucasian	  Sovnarkom,	  25	  Feb.	  1926,	  SUITsA,	  f.	  617,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  890,	  l.	  1.	  59	  Correspondence	  between	  Azeri	  and	  Transcaucasian	  organs	  on	  this	  aspect,	  May–June	  1926,	  SUITsA,	  f.	  617,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  1209,	  ll.	  1–6.	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bridgehead	  for	  penetration60.	  Two	  first	  attempts	  were	  made	  to	  advertise	  Soviet	  science	  and	   technics	   to	  a	  broad	   Iranian	  audience	   in	  1923	  and	  1925,	  at	   important	   fairs	  held	   in	  Teheran.	  In	  November–December	  1923,	  a	  first	  fair	  was	  organised	  in	  Teheran,	  where	  the	  Soviet	   Union	   was	   the	   only	   country	   represented.	   The	   ambassador	   Shumjatskij	  emphasised	  the	  importance	  of	  taking	  part	  to	  this	  fair	  ‘in	  order	  to	  propagandise	  both	  the	  general	   economic	   situation	   of	   Soviet	   Russia	   and	   some	   industrial	   branches’.61	  Even	  though	  Iranians	  were	  disappointed	  by	  the	  absence	  of	  other	  European	  countries,	  Soviet	  exhibits	  apparently	  sparked	  some	  curiosity.	  The	  chairman	  of	  the	  organising	  committee,	  Mohtashem	  os-­‐Saltane,	  considered	  that	  Soviet	  agricultural	  machinery	  and	  manufactures	  were	  a	  model	   for	  Persia	  to	  emulate.	  Soviet	  staff,	  he	  stressed,	  had	  a	  positive	  attitude	  to	  technological	  and	  scientific	  transfer.62	  A	  second	  exhibition	  opened	  in	  August–September	  1925,	  oriented	   towards	  agricultural	  machinery,	  where	  Soviet	  state	   trusts	  occupied	   the	  first	  place	  in	  quantitative	  terms,	  beyond	  British	  and	  American	  industries.63	  	  This	   influence	  was	   also	   institutional,	   as	   Soviet	   diplomacy	   urged	   Iran	   to	   transform	   its	  administrative	   structure.	   Such	   a	   transformation	   was	   to	   bring	   Soviet	   and	   Iranian	  institutions	   of	   locust	   control	   closer	   together.	   In	   a	   private	   meeting	   with	   the	   Iranian	  Foreign	  Minister,	   Forughi,	   the	   Soviet	   ambassador	   Chernykh	   emphasised	   in	  May	   1935	  the	   inadequacy	   of	   Iranian	   structures	   for	   locust-­‐fighting:	   ‘The	   main	   problem	   is	   the	  disproportion	  between	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  scourge	  and	  the	  material	  resources	  provided	  by	  the	  Persian	  government	  to	  fight	  it’.64	  It	  was	  not	  all	  about	  technique	  or	  science,	  but	  also	  organisation.	  Environmental	  cooperation	  was	  thus	  a	  factor	  in	  institutional	  transfer	  and	  contributed	  to	  the	  aforementioned	  mutual	  observation	  and	  influences	  between	  Turkey,	  Iran	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Three	  aspects	  may	  be	  emphasised	  in	  Soviet	  behaviour	  toward	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  For	  considerations	  on	  ‘science	  as	  knowledge-­‐practice’	  and	  priority	  given	  to	  biology,	  parasitology	  and	  geology	  at	  the	  time	  in	  Persia,	  see	  the	  work	  of	  Cyrus	  Schayegh,	  Who	  is	  Knowledgeable	  is	  Strong.	  Science,	  
Class,	  and	  the	  Formation	  of	  Modern	  Iranian	  Society,	  1900–1950	  (Berkeley;	  Los	  Angeles;	  London:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  2009)	  pp.	  50–58	  and	  75.	  	  61	  Letter	  from	  Shumjatskij	  to	  the	  Russian-­‐Oriental	  Chamber	  of	  Trade,	  18	  June	  1923,	  SUITsA,	  f.	  617,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  198,	  l.	  29.	  	  62	  ‘Tegeranskaja	  sel’sko-­‐khozjajstvennaja	  vystavka’,	  Bakinskij	  Rabochij	  286	  /	  1014	  (18	  Dec.1923):	  3.	  	  63	  A.E.	  Ioffe,	  Mezhdunarodnye	  svjazi	  Sovetskoj	  nauki,	  tekhniki	  i	  kul’tury,	  1917–1932	  (Moscow:	  Nauka,	  1975)	  pp.	  363–364.	  	  64	  Report	  from	  Chernykh	  on	  his	  meeting	  with	  Forughi,	  28	  May	  1935,	  Y.V.	  Borisov	  et	  al.	  (eds)	  DVP	  SSSR,	  Vol.	  17,	  1973,	  pp.	  356.	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Iran:	   influence	   in	   the	   training	   of	   agricultural	   managers,	   transformation	   of	   the	   state	  apparatus	  and	  creation	  of	  an	  ‘epistemic	  community’	  through	  regular	  intercourse.65	  	  First,	  the	  Soviet	  Embassy	  in	  Teheran	  welcomed	  the	  creation	  in	  Karaj,	  near	  Tehran,	  of	  an	  agricultural	   college	   (Medrese-­‐ye	   Ali-­‐ye	   Falâhat),	   designed	   to	   train	   a	   new	   agricultural	  elite,	   familiar	   with	   scientific	   and	   technical	   approaches.	   Karaj	   would	   hopefully	   train	  officials	  closer	  in	  mindset	  to	  their	  Soviet	  counterparts	  and	  more	  cooperative	  than	  older	  and	  more	  conservative	  ones.	  Karaj	  actually	  trained	  almost	  all	  Iranian	  managers	  involved	  in	   agriculture	   in	   the	   1920s–1930s	   and	   greatly	   helped	   implement	   pest	   control	   in	   the	  country.	  Students	  were	  regularly	  sent	  to	  Persian	  Azerbaijan	  to	  take	  part	  to	  anti-­‐acridian	  campaigns	   and	   have	   contacts	   with	   Russian	   experts.66	  Soviet	   support	   for	   the	   college	  translated	  into	  teacher	  exchanges	  and	  ties	  with	  the	  Azeri	  Agricultural	  Institute,	  but	  also	  gifts	   from	   Transcaucasian	   or	   central	   authorities,	   such	   as	   agricultural	   machinery	   in	  summer	   1931.67	  Numerous	   experts	   and	   teachers	   at	   the	   college	   had	   received	   their	  scientific	   training	   in	   the	   Russian	   Caucasus.	   Jalal	   Afshar,	   a	   founding	   father	   of	   Iranian	  entomology,	  studied	  in	  Tiflis	  and	  Moscow	  before	  World	  War	  One.	  When	  he	  came	  back	  to	  Iran	   in	  1919,	   he	  worked	   first	   for	   the	  newly-­‐established	  Pasteur	   Institute,	   then	   for	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Public	  Works.	  He	  began	  to	  teach	  entomology,	  zoology	  and	  epidemic	  control	  at	   Karaj	   in	   1926	   and	   created	   an	   entomological	   laboratory	   there.68	  He	   was	   a	   great	  translator	   and	   populariser	   of	   foreign	   scientific	   knowledge	   on	   agricultural	   pests	   in	   the	  late	  1930s,	  while	  insisting	  that	  Iranians	  should	  themselves	  become	  active	  producers	  of	  such	  knowledge.	  Among	  numerous	  works,	  he	  published	  the	  first	  entomological	  treaty	  in	  Persian,	  Hashar-­‐i	  shenâsi	  (1937–1945).	  	  The	  influence	  of	  Jalal	  Afshar	  not	  only	  appeared	  in	  the	  field	  of	  scientific	  knowledge,	  but	  also	  that	  of	  administrative	  evolutions.	  Agriculture	  still	  had	  no	  ministry	  of	  its	  own,	  which	  caused	  diplomatic	  difficulties	  in	  intergovernmental	  correspondence.	  Some	  progress	  was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Following	  the	  widely	  known	  concept	  coined	  by	  Peter	  Haas,	  ‘Introduction:	  Epistemic	  Communities	  and	  International	  Policy	  Coordination’,	  International	  Organization	  46	  /	  1	  (1992):	  1–35.	  66	  British	  consulate	  in	  Tabriz,	  Tabriz	  Locust	  Report	  for	  August	  1931,	  undated,	  Natural	  History	  Museum	  Archives	  (NHMA),	  AL/2/100.	  	  67	  Report	  E	  4069/151/34,	  29	  July	  1931,	  R.M.	  Burrell	  and	  R.L.	  Jarman	  (eds)	  Iran	  Political	  Diaries	  Vol.	  9:	  
1931–1934	  (London:	  Archive	  Edition,	  1997),	  p.	  37;	  on	  the	  Azeri	  Agricultural	  Institute,	  located	  in	  Baku	  until	  1929	  then	  in	  Ganja,	  Bahadur	  Heydəәr	  Ibrahimov,	  Istorija	  veterinarii	  v	  Azerbajdzhane	  (s	  drevnikh	  vremen	  do	  
nashikh	  dnei)	  (Baku:	  Elm,	  1971)	  pp.	  338–9.	  	  68	  Cyrus	  Abivardi,	  Iranian	  Entomology,	  2:	  Applied	  Entomology	  (Berlin;	  Heidelberg;	  New	  York:	  Springer,	  2001)	  pp.	  532–534.	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made	  since	  the	  late	  1920s.	  On	  22	  July	  1929,	  the	  Persian	  government	  agreed	  to	  create	  as	  a	  first	  step	  a	  locust	  office	  in	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Public	  Works.69	  Soon	  after,	  the	  Majlis	  passed	  a	   law	   launching	   the	   first	   locust	   campaign	   in	   Iran.70 	  The	   new	   acridian	   office	   was	  instrumental	   in	   pushing	   legislation	   favouring	   anti-­‐locust	   campaigns,	   such	   as	   the	  suppression	  of	  customs	  tariffs	  on	  the	  import	  of	  pesticides.71	  As	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  the	  first	  buyer	  of	  Persian	  cotton	  and	  agricultural	  products,	  it	  also	  had	  numerous	  commercial	  representatives	   that	   exerted	   their	   own	   pressure	   on	   Persian	   counterparts.	   The	   joint	  company	   Perskhlopok,	   created	   in	   1923,	   had	   branches	   in	   numerous	   towns	   in	   cotton-­‐growing	  areas	  and	  played	  a	   role	   in	   the	  modernisation	  of	   this	   sector.72	  Constant	  Soviet	  presence	   in	   the	  1930s	  achieved	  progressive	  extension	  of	   the	   locust	  office.	   In	  1934,	   an	  Agricultural	   Department	   was	   formally	   created	   at	   the	   Ministry	   for	   National	   Economy.	  Mostafa	  Quli	  Khan	  Bayat	  became	   its	   first	  director,	  while	   Jalal	  Afshar	  was	  appointed	  as	  main	  scientific	  advisor.	  Bayat	  gained	  the	  right	  to	  sit	  in	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers,	  despite	  his	  lower	  rank,	  testifying	  to	  the	  rising	  importance	  of	  agricultural	  issues,	  in	  both	  internal	  and	  external	  affairs.	  However,	  a	  full-­‐fledged	  ministry	  for	  Agriculture	  was	  not	  instituted	  before	  September	  1941.73	  	  Thirdly,	   Soviet	   authorities	   insisted	   on	   organising	   bilateral	   conferences	   and	   technical	  meetings	   from	  the	   late	  1920s	  on.	  Until	   its	  end	   in	  1936,	   the	  Transcaucasian	  Federation	  played	   a	   key	   role	   in	   creating	   a	   regional	   dynamics	   between	   the	   Soviet	   Caucasus	   and	  Northern	  Iran,	  even	  though	  the	  Russian	  Narkomzem	  had	  a	  pretension	  to	  steer	  the	  entire	  collaboration	   process.	   Baku	   and	   Moscow	   were	   the	   two	   common	   venues	   for	   such	  conferences.	  In	  1927,	  a	   joint	  commission	  on	  locust	  control	   in	  the	  Mugan	  steppe	  met	  in	  Moscow	  and	  insisted	  on	  technical	  cooperation	  between	  the	  two	  states	  in	  the	  Mugan.	  The	  commission	  mingled	  technical,	  administrative	  and	  political	  debates,	  as	  demonstrated	  by	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  N.S.	  Shcherbinovskij,	  Pustynnaja	  sarancha	  shistotserka.	  Problema	  zashchity	  juzhnykh	  territorij	  SSSR	  ot	  
vtorzhenija	  staj	  shistotserki,	  Moscow:	  Gosizdatel’stvo	  sel’sko-­‐khozjajstvennoj	  literatury,	  1952,	  p.	  378–381.	  	  70	  Reports	  E	  195/195/34,	  28	  Dec.	  1929,	  and	  E	  472/195/34,	  Burrell	  and	  Jarman	  (eds)	  cit.,	  Vol.	  8:	  1927–1930,	  pp.	  416	  and	  511.	  	  71	  Letter	  of	  the	  German	  legation	  in	  Teheran	  to	  the	  German	  Foreign	  Ministry,	  5	  Sept.	  1930,	  Politisches	  
Archiv	  des	  Auwärtigen	  Amtes	  (PA	  AA),	  Länderabteilung	  III	  (1920–1936),	  Persien,	  R	  92541.	  	  72	  N.A.	  Gasanov,	  ‘Iz	  istorii	  sovetsko-­‐iranskikh	  druzhestvennykh	  otnoshenij	  (1923–1925	  gg.)’,	  
Uchenye	  zapiski	  Azerbajdzhanskogo	  Gosudarstvennogo	  Universiteta	  im.	  S.M.	  Kirova,	  Seria	  istorii	  i	  
filosofii	  6	  (1965):	  25–6.	  	  73	  Cyrus	  Abivardi,	  Iranian	  Entomology	  cit.,	  2001,	  p.	  534.	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its	   proceedings.74	  In	   the	   early	   1930s,	   Soviet	   officials	   regularly	   took	   part	   in	   the	   locust	  committees	   set	   up	   in	   Persian	   Azerbaijan	   and	   acted	   as	   technical	   advisors.75	  In	   January	  1936,	   the	   last	   important	   conference	   of	   the	   period	   was	   organised	   between	   the	   two	  countries.76	  The	   Azeri	   Narkomzem,	   Vezirov,	   headed	   the	   Soviet	   delegation,	   since	   the	  conference	   took	   place	   in	   Baku.	   The	   Persian	   delegation	   toured	   Azerbaijan	   and	   bought	  agricultural	   machinery,	   chemical	   products;	   and	   Iranian	   entomologists	   travelled	   to	  Kirovabad	  –	  the	  new	  name	  for	  Ganja,	  since	  1935	  –	  where	  they	  got	  acquainted	  with	  the	  latest	   field	   discoveries.	   The	   deputy	   director	   for	   Agriculture,	   Ahmed	   ‘Adl,	   told	   Soviet	  newspapers	   of	   his	   admiration	   for	   the	   transformation	   of	   Soviet	   Azerbaijan,	   which	   he	  hadn’t	  visited	  since	  1928.	  He	  remarked	  on	  his	  interest	  in	  Azeri	  agricultural	  institutions,	  notably	  the	  Azeri	  Tropical	  Institute.	  	  Iranian	   leaders	   were	   evidently	   lucid	   about	   the	   political	   motivations	   for	   Soviet	   help.	  Border	  authorities	  were	  particularly	  sensitive	  to	  the	  manipulation	  of	   locust-­‐control	  for	  gaining	  influence	  in	  the	  country.	  In	  some	  districts	  of	  Mugan,	  Iranian	  officials	  complained	  in	  1930	   that	   the	  digging	  of	   anti-­‐locust	   trenches	   in	   Iranian	   territory	  had	  been	   a	   Soviet	  strategy	   since	   1925	   to	   advance	   their	   state	   border.	   They	   gave	   the	   example	   of	   a	   trench	  transformed	   into	   a	   permanent	   canal,	   cemented	   and	   wired,	   near	   the	   village	   of	   Hasan	  Khanly.77	  More	  generally,	   the	  presence	  of	  Soviet	  experts	  was	  inseparable	  from	  the	  fear	  of	   Communist	   penetration.	   The	   action	   of	  Perskhlopok,	   since	   it	   involved	   daily	   contacts	  with	  rural	  masses,	  caused	  particular	  concern	  to	  the	  police.	  Credits	  extended	  to	  peasants	  created	  an	  economic	  dependence	  and	  a	  form	  of	  loyalty	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  especially	  in	  the	  poorest	  regions.78	  This	  awareness	  led	  Iranian	  leaders	  to	  monitor	  Soviet	  expeditions	  on	  their	  soil	  as	  closely	  as	  possible.	  However,	  the	  model	  for	  development	  aid	  created	  in	  the	   country	   seemed	   successful	   enough	   to	   be	   progressively	   enlarged	   across	   the	   entire	  region.	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  Konfrans-­‐e	  misyûn-­‐e	  mokhtalat-­‐e	  Irân	  o	  Shuravi	  baraye	  davf-­‐e	  malakh-­‐e	  Mughân	  (Tehran:	  publisher	  unknown),	  1325	  (1946):	  14–15.	  	  75	  British	  Consulate	  in	  Tabriz,	  Tabriz	  locust	  report	  for	  June	  1930,	  undated,	  NHMA,	  AL/2/100.	  	  76	  ‘Zakonchilas’	  sovetsko-­‐iranskaja	  konferentsija	  po	  bor’be	  s	  saranchej’,	  Bakinskij	  Rabochij	  10	  /	  4089:	  4.	  	  77	  Letter	  from	  the	  Iranian	  General	  Staff	  to	  the	  prime	  minister,	  24	  farvardin	  1309	  (13	  April	  1930),	  in	  Mahmud	  Tâherahmadi,	  Asnâd-­‐e	  ravâbit-­‐e	  Irân	  o	  Shuravi	  (Teheran:	  Enteshârât-­‐e	  Sâzemân-­‐e	  Asnâd-­‐e	  Melli-­‐e	  Irân,	  1996)	  p.	  170.	  	  78	  Letter	  from	  the	  intelligence	  department	  of	  the	  Iranian	  police	  to	  the	  minister	  of	  the	  Interior,	  29	  behmân	  1309	  (18	  Feb.	  1931),	  ibid,	  p.	  38.	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  REGIONALISING	  ENVIRONMENTAL	  COOPERATION	  IN	  THE	  1930S	  Starting	  from	  the	  late	  1920s,	  Soviet	  authorities	  entered	  into	  a	  new	  course	  of	  expanding	  the	   geographical	   scope	   of	   their	   antiacridian	   foreign	   policy.	   This	   policy	  was	   conceived,	  more	   generally,	   as	   a	   cross-­‐border	   cooperation	   on	   environmental	   issues.	   This	  cooperation	  was	  seen	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  break	  the	  international	  isolation	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	   and	   create	   a	   network	   of	   friendly	   states.	   Cooperation	  with	   Iran	  was	   clearly	   the	  most	   advanced	   bilateral	   relation	   built	   on	   this	   basis.	   Negotiations	   with	   Afghanistan	  brought	   less	   in	   the	  way	  of	   results,	   since	   the	  Afghan	  state	  was	   in	  a	  situation	  of	  chronic	  instability	  and	  had	  practically	  no	  state	  apparatus	  to	  deal	  with	  agricultural	  matters.	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  nonetheless	  tried	  to	  extend	  the	  pattern	  of	  Soviet-­‐Iranian	  cooperation	  to	  a	  larger	   audience	   by	   convening	   an	   international	   conference	   in	   1928.	   In	   September,	   in	  coordination	  with	  the	  ZSFSR	  and	  Central	  Asian	  republics,	  the	  NKID	  decided	  to	  organise	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year	  an	  international	  conference	  on	  locust	  management,	  with	  delegates	  from	   Turkey,	   Iran,	   Afghanistan,	   Mongolia	   and	   Western	   China.79 	  Preparatory	   work	  revealed	  that	  the	  STO’s	  Veterinary	  Committee	  and	  the	  People’s	  Commissariat	  for	  Health	  were	   interested	   in	   organising	   their	   own	   conference	   on	   cross-­‐border	   struggles	   with	  human	   and	   animal	   diseases.	   It	   was	   thus	   decided	   by	   the	   All-­‐Union	   Sovnarkom	   on	   22	  September	  1927	  to	  organise	  a	  joint	  conference	  on	  agricultural	  and	  sanitary	  issues.80	  The	  Transcaucasian	   representation	   in	   Moscow	   manifested	   from	   the	   very	   beginning	   its	  interest	   and	   willingness	   to	   take	   an	   active	   share	   in	   the	   process,	   since	   it	   was	   directly	  involved	  with	   issues	   to	  be	  addressed.	  The	  conference	  was	   finally	   scheduled	   for	  March	  1928,	  with	   an	   All-­‐Union	   funding	   and	   the	   participation	   of	   both	   central	   and	   republican	  representatives81.	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  Under	  Yang	  Zengxin	  and	  Jin	  Shuren,	  Xinjiang	  was	  a	  de	  facto	  independent	  state	  in	  the	  1920s–1930s,	  considered	  as	  an	  autonomous	  diplomatic	  actor	  and	  an	  important	  neighbour	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  James	  A.	  Millward,	  Eurasian	  Crossroads.	  A	  History	  of	  Xinjiang	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2007)	  pp.	  186–7;	  for	  the	  Mongolian	  situation,	  see	  Elena	  Boikova,	  ‘Aspects	  of	  Soviet-­‐Mongolian	  Relations,	  1929–1939’,	  in	  Stephen	  Kotkin	  and	  Bruce	  A.	  Elleman	  (eds)	  Mongolia	  in	  the	  Twentieth	  Century.	  Landlocked	  Cosmopolitan,	  pp.	  107–122	  (Armonk-­‐London:	  M.E.	  Sharpe,	  1999).	  	  80	  Letter	  from	  the	  Zakpredstavitel’stvo	  to	  the	  Transcaucasian	  Sovnarkom,	  2	  Feb.	  1928,	  SUITsA,	  f.	  617,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  2331,	  ll.	  1–3.	  	  81	  Correspondence	  of	  the	  All-­‐Union	  Sovnarkom	  on	  granting	  8,000	  rubles	  for	  the	  conference,	  GARF	  (Gosudarstvennyj	  arkhiv	  Rossijskoj	  Federatsii,	  Moscow),	  f.	  P5446,	  op.	  10,	  d.	  1399,	  ll.	  1–5;	  Protocol	  No.	  161	  of	  the	  All-­‐Union	  Sovnarkom,	  5	  Mar.	  1928,	  SUIYA,	  f.	  617,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  2331,	  l.	  31.	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On16	   December	   1927,	   the	   Russian	   Narkomzem	   defined	   as	   follows	   the	   issues	   to	   be	  settled	  at	  the	  conference:	  	  	   1)	  Coordination	  of	  measures	  taken	  to	  fight	  against	  cotton	  pests,	  in	  particular	  the	  quarantine	   to	   prevent	   the	   introduction	   of	   cotton	   parasites	   and	   diseases	   into	  USSR,	  2)	  Organisation	  of	  the	  struggle	  against	  locusts	  in	  border	  regions,	  3)	  Project	  of	   a	   general	   quarantine	   to	   prevent	   the	   introduction	   of	   plant	   parasites	   and	  diseases	  into	  USSR.82	  	  The	  conference	  thus	  suggested	  a	  geographical	  extension	  of	  cross-­‐border	  collaborations,	  as	  well	   as	   an	   extension	   to	   the	  wider	   problem	   of	   plant	   protection.	   By	   doing	   so,	   Soviet	  authorities	   entered	   a	   new	   field	   of	   international	   relations,	   launched	   by	   the	   Rome	  conference	   on	   plant	   pathology	   in	   1914.83	  This	   issue	   was	   of	   particular	   interest	   to	   the	  Transcaucasian	   federation,	   directly	   concerned	   by	   border	   quarantines	   on	   cotton	   and	  other	   agricultural	   products.84	  The	   persistence	   of	   strong	   economic	   links	   with	   Eastern	  Anatolia,	  which	  had	  been	  included	  in	  the	  Tsarist	  Empire	  from	  1878	  to	  1921,	  and	  where	  numerous	   plant	   diseases	   were	   rife,	   created	   an	   urgent	   need	   for	   border	   control.85	  In	  1927–1928,	  for	  instance,	  Transcaucasian	  leaders	  were	  preoccupied	  with	  the	  diffusion	  of	  the	   pink	   bollworm	   (Pectinophora	   gossypiella),	   a	   cotton	   pest,	   in	   the	   Igdyr	   region.	   An	  Armenian	  entomologist,	  Dekomidov,	  was	  dispatched	  in	  early	  1928	  to	  this	  area,	  but	  came	  to	  no	  clear	  conclusion	  as	  to	  the	  necessity	  of	  a	  quarantine.86	  Measures	  to	  check	  imported	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  Letter	  from	  the	  Zakpredstavitel’stvo	  to	  the	  Transcaucasian	  Sovnarkom,	  2	  Feb.	  1928,	  SUITsA,	  f.	  617,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  2331,	  ll.	  2–3.	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  Stéphane	  Castonguay,	  ‘Biorégionalisme,	  commerce	  agricole	  et	  propagation	  des	  insectes	  nuisibles	  et	  des	  maladies	  végétales:	  les	  conventions	  internationales	  phytopathologiques,	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  Ruralia	  16/17	  (2005),	  online;	  for	  the	  scientific	  basis	  of	  this	  new	  interest,	  see	  W.A.	  Orton	  and	  R.	  Kent	  Beattie,	  ‘The	  Biological	  Basis	  of	  Foreign	  Plant	  Quarantines’,	  Phytopathology	  13	  /	  7	  (July	  1923):	  295–306.	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  An	  Interdepartmental	  Commission	  on	  the	  cotton	  quarantine	  was	  created	  in	  May	  1927	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  the	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  Panteleev,	  ‘Organizatsija	  karantina	  po	  nedopushcheniju	  zanosa	  inozemnykh	  vreditelej	  khlopchatnika	  v	  SSSR’,	  Khlopkovoe	  delo	  12	  (Dec.	  1929):	  1437–55.	  	  85	  Candan	  Badem,	  Çarlık	  Rusyası	  Yönetiminde	  Kars	  Vilayeti	  (Istanbul:	  Birzamanlar	  Yayıncılık,	  2010);	  Georg	  Kobro,	  Das	  Gebiet	  von	  Kars	  und	  Ardahan:	  Historisch-­‐landeskundliche	  Studie	  zu	  einer	  Grenzregion	  in	  
Ostanatolien	  (Munich:	  Slavica,	  1989);	  Ararat	  Hakopjan,	  Karsi	  marz:	  gjughats’iut’jan	  patmut’jan	  urvagts’er	  
1878–1917	  t’t’	  (Erevan:	  Djartaraget,	  2000).	  	  86	  Protocol	  No.	  13,	  Interdepartmental	  Commission	  of	  the	  Glavkhlopkom	  on	  the	  cotton	  quarantine,	  19	  Mar.	  1928,	  SUITsA,	  f.	  617,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  2331,	  l.	  33.	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cotton	  at	  Markara	  and	  Leninakan	  were	  implemented	  in	  March.	  By	  May,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  the	   pink	   bollworm	   had	   caused	   ravages	   in	   the	   region	   and	   an	   internal	   quarantine	  was	  implemented	  behind	  the	  Soviet	  border.	  Cotton	  could	  be	  imported	  but	  not	  moved	  beyond	  the	   border	   region,	   so	   as	   not	   to	   contaminate	   Caucasian	   cotton	   fields	   in	   Armenia	   and	  Nakhichevan.	  	  At	   the	   conference,	   the	   majority	   of	   official	   speeches	   and	   reports	   were	   made	   by	  representatives	   of	   central	   institutions,	   such	   as	   the	   Russian	   Narkomzem	   and	   the	   State	  Institute	   of	   Experimental	   Agriculture.	   One	   report	   was	   entrusted	   to	   a	   republican	  delegate.	   Zakhar	   Rodionov,	   head	   of	   the	   Entomological	   Experimental	   Station	   in	  Azerbaijani	  Mugan	  from	  1920	  to	  1927,	   talked	  about	  management	  of	  cotton	  pests.	  This	  speech	  built	  upon	  a	  book	  he	  had	   just	  published,	  where	  he	  demonstrated	  the	  similarity	  between	  challenges	  set	  to	  Persia	  and	  Southern	  Soviet	  republics	  in	  the	  culture	  of	  cotton.87	  The	  report	  was	  to	  be	  prepared	  in	  coordination	  with	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Turkmen	  Office	  for	  Plant	   Protection,	   Morits. 88 	  Generally	   speaking,	   the	   influence	   of	   Transcaucasian	  institutions	   in	   the	   preparation	   for	   the	   conference	  was	   felt	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   concentrate	  debates	   on	   cross-­‐border	   cooperation	   with	   neighbouring	   countries.	   The	   ministry	   of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  had	  made	  clear	  that	  the	  number	  of	  topics	  addressed	  and	  demands	  should	  be	  reduced	  to	  a	  minimum	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  satisfaction.	  Consequently,	  everyone	  tried	  to	   push	   their	   own	   interests. 89 	  During	   the	   conference,	   the	   main	   role	   fell	   to	   the	  Commissariat	  for	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  which	  had	  been	  entrusted	  with	  the	  task	  of	  submitting	  to	   each	  Oriental	   delegation	   two	  draft	   conventions	  on	   cotton	  quarantine	   and	  on	   cross-­‐border	  cooperation	  for	  locust	  management.90	  	  This	  conference	  on	  area-­‐wide	  pest	  management	  reflected	  Soviet	  preferences	  by	  insisting	  on	  cotton,	  so	  central	  to	  the	  nascent	  Soviet	  industry	  and	  perhaps	  even	  more	  to	  the	  Soviet	  propaganda	   that	   created	   a	   myth	   around	   this	   crop	   that	   turned	   desert	   into	   lands	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  Zakhar	  Rodionov,	  Vrediteli	  khlopchatnika	  v	  Persii	  (Moscow,	  Biblioteka	  Khlopkovogo	  Dela,	  1928).	  	  88	  Letter	  from	  the	  Zakpredstavitel’stvo	  to	  the	  Transcaucasian	  Sovnarkom,	  2	  Feb.	  1928,	  SUITsA,	  f.	  617,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  2331,	  l.	  3.	  	  89	  Letter	  from	  the	  Georgian	  Commissar	  for	  Agriculture,	  Gegechkori,	  to	  the	  Russian	  Narkomzem,	  14	  January	  1928,	  SUITsA,	  f.	  617,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  2331,	  l.	  28.	  	  90	  Secret	  supplement	  to	  the	  Protocol	  No.	  268	  of	  the	  All-­‐Union	  Sovnarkom,	  3	  July	  1928,	  SUITsA,	  f.	  616,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  2,	  ll.	  306–310.	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plenty.91	  The	  Transcaucasian	  Regional	  Committee	  edited	  a	  secret	  booklet	  on	  the	  culture	  of	   cotton	   as	   a	   state	   priority	   in	   1930.92	  It	   also	   fit	   into	   a	   global	   context	   of	   transnational	  collaboration	  against	  the	  locust	  threat.	  Better	  scientific	  understanding	  of	  the	  migratory	  phenomenon	   was	   part	   of	   the	   explanation	   for	   this	   turn,	   which	   was	   expressed	   in	  publications	   that	   stressed	   the	  newly	  understood	  continental	  nature	  of	   the	   threats	  and	  required	  international	  mechanisms	  of	  action.93	  A	  second	  explanation	  could	  be	  linked	  to	  the	  involvement	  of	  France	  and	  Great-­‐Britain	  in	  former	  Ottoman	  regions.	  These	  regions,	  together	  with	  the	  Arabic	  Peninsula	  and	  Iran,	  were	  a	  corridor	  for	  locust	  migrations	  at	  the	  crossroads	  between	  Asia,	  Eastern	  Europe,	  the	  Mediterranean	  and	  Africa.	  For	  the	  British	  Empire,	  in	  particular,	  joint	  locust	  management	  was	  a	  way	  to	  express	  concretely	  common	  goals	  from	  Delhi	  to	  Lagos,	  at	  a	  time	  when	  imperial	  unity	  was	  seen	  as	  threatened.94	  The	  Imperial	  Bureau	  of	  Entomology,	  created	  in	  1913,	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  the	  1910s–1920s	  in	   intra-­‐imperial	   coordination	   and	   information	   exchange.95	  Great-­‐Britain	   and	   France	  actually	   spurred	   their	   mandates	   in	   the	   Middle	   East	   to	   enter	   an	   agreement	   on	   locust	  control.	  On	  20	  May	  1926,	  a	  treaty	  was	  signed	  between	  Syria,	  Jordan,	  Iraq,	  Palestine	  and	  Turkey	   to	   create	   an	   International	   Office	   for	   Information	   Regarding	   Locusts	   (Office	  
international	  de	  renseignement	  sur	  les	  sauterelles),	  based	  in	  Damas.96	  A	  few	  years	  later,	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  Adrienne	  Lynn	  Edgar,	  Tribal	  Nation.	  The	  Making	  of	  Soviet	  Turkmenistan,	  pp.	  206–7	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2006)	  pp.	  206–7;	  Beatrice	  Penati,	  ‘Le	  comité	  du	  coton	  et	  les	  autres.	  Secteur	  cotonnier	  et	  pouvoir	  économique	  en	  Ouzbékistan,	  1922–1927’,	  Cahiers	  du	  monde	  russe	  52	  /	  4	  (2011):	  555–589.	  92	  The	  ZSFSR,	  above	  all	  Azerbaijan	  and	  Nakhichevan,	  was	  admittedly	  only	  the	  second	  production	  area	  for	  cotton	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  behind	  Central	  Asia.	  SUITsA,	  f.	  616,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  5,	  ll.	  240–256.	  	  93	  Paul	  Vayssière,	  ‘Le	  problème	  acridien	  et	  sa	  solution	  internationale’,	  Matériaux	  pour	  l’étude	  des	  calamités	  
possibles	  2	  (Genève:	  Société	  de	  Géographie,	  1924):,	  122–158;	  the	  first	  anti-­‐acridian	  and	  phytopathological	  regional	  organisation	  was	  the	  Defensa	  agricola	  created	  in	  1913	  among	  between	  Chile,	  Brazil,	  Argentina	  and	  Uruguay:	  Informe	  de	  los	  trabajos	  de	  la	  Conferencia	  internacional	  de	  la	  Defensa	  Agrícola	  en	  Montevideo,	  (Asunción,	  1913).	  	  94	  John	  Darwin,	  The	  Empire	  Project.	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  the	  British	  World	  System,	  1830–1970	  ,	  pp.	  419–75	  (Cambridge-­‐New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2009)	  pp.	  419–75	  ;	  Antonio	  Buj,	  ‘International	  Experimentations	  and	  Control	  of	  the	  Locust	  Plague	  –	  Africa	  in	  the	  First	  Half	  of	  the	  20th	  20th	  CCentury’,	  in	  Yvon	  Chatelin	  and	  Christophe	  Bonneuil	  (eds.)	  ,	  Les	  sciences	  hors	  d’Occident	  au	  XXe	  siècle,	  Vol.	  3	  :	  Nature	  et	  
environnement,	  pp.	  93–105	  (Paris:	  Orstom	  Editions,	  1995)	  pp.	  93–105.	  	  95	  C.	  Gordon	  Hewitt,	  ‘The	  Imperial	  Bureau	  of	  Entomology’,	  The	  Canadian	  Entomologist.	  45	  /,	  6	  (June	  1913):	  171–174;	  C.	  Gordon	  Hewitt,	  ‘A	  Review	  of	  Applied	  Entomology	  in	  the	  British	  Empire’,	  Annals	  of	  the	  
Entomological	  Society	  of	  America	  IX	  /	  1	  (,	  Vol.	  IX,	  No.	  1,	  March	  1916,	  pp.):	  3–34.	  	  96	  Ahmet	  Gündüz	  Ökçün	  and,	  Ahmet	  R.	  Ökçün,	  Türk	  antlaşmaları	  rehberi	  (1920–1973)	  ,	  p.	  145	  (Ankara:	  Ankara	  Universitesi	  Siyasal	  Bilgiler	  Fakültesi	  Yayınları,	  1974)	  p.	  145	  ;	  Jean-­‐David	  Mizrahi,	  Genèse	  de	  l’Etat	  
mandataire.	  Service	  des	  Renseignements	  et	  bandes	  armées	  en	  Syrie	  et	  au	  Liban	  dans	  les	  années	  1920	  ,	  p.	  175	  (Paris:	  Publications	  de	  la	  Sorbonne,	  2003)	  p.	  175.	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March	  1931,	  Persia	  announced	  its	  adhesion	  to	  the	  Office.97	  All	  these	  developments	  were	  part,	   in	  Soviet	  interpretations,	  of	  the	  general	  imperialist	  plot	  to	  contain	  communism	  in	  the	  region	  and	  organise	  counter-­‐revolution	  in	  the	  Caucasus.	  	  In	   the	   early	   1930s,	   this	   general	   interest	   in	   bilateral	   or	   imperial	   cooperation	   evolved	  toward	   attempts	   at	   wider	   multilateral	   management.	   A	   parallel	   evolution	   could	   be	  observed	  in	  Soviet	  diplomacy.	  The	  concomitance	  between	  Western	  and	  Soviet	  initiatives	  was	   probably	   rooted	   in	   the	   Soviet	   unwillingness	   to	   concede	   a	  monopoly	   to	   a	   British-­‐dominated	   locust	   management	   system.	   It	   should	   also	   be	   recalled	   that	   the	   USSR	  surreptitiously	   renounced	   its	   categorical	   hostility	   to	   multilateralism	   by	   joining	   the	  League	  of	  Nations	  in	  1934.98	  This	  system	  would	  have	  embraced	  all	  states	  located	  south	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	   in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  Central	  Asia.	  At	  a	  time	  when	  relations	  with	  Great-­‐Britain	   remained	   conflicted	   and	   the	   imminence	   of	   an	   imperialist	   war	   was	  emphasised,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  nefarious	  to	  leave	  such	  an	  important	  matter	  to	  hostile	  powers.	   As	   international	   locust	   cooperation	   was	   essentially	   an	   inter-­‐imperial	  cooperation,	   it	   could	   not	   be	   accepted	   by	   the	   Soviet	   Union.	   The	   first	   international	  conference	  on	  locust	  management	  was	  held	  in	  Rome	  in	  September–October	  1931,	  on	  a	  joint	  Italian	  and	  British	  initiative.99	  This	  conference	  confirmed	  Soviet	  apprehensions,	  by	  selecting	  the	  Imperial	  Bureau	  of	  Entomology	  –	  soon	  to	  become	  the	  Imperial	  Institute	  of	  Entomology	  –	  as	  the	  hub	  for	  information	  exchange	  in	  the	  field.	  Several	  conferences	  were	  held	   later	   in	   the	   1930s:	   July	   1932	   in	   Paris,	   September	   1934	   in	   London,	  April	   1936	   in	  Cairo	  and	  September	  1938	  in	  Brussels.	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  took	  part	  in	  none	  of	  them.	  	  In	   January	   1933,	   Soviet	   authorities	   communicated	   to	   the	   Afghan	   and	   Iranian	  governments	   their	   willingness	   to	   sign	   bilateral	   locust	   conventions,	   since	   the	   1928	  conference	   had	   not	   been	   successful	   in	   this	   respect. 100 	  This	   diplomatic	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  Letter	  from	  the	  Persian	  consul-­‐general	  in	  Beyrut	  to	  the	  president	  of	  the	  Office,	  12	  March	  Mar.	  1931,	  NHMA,	  AL/1/6.	  98	  Sabine	  Dullin,	  Des	  hommes	  d’influence.	  Les	  ambassadeurs	  de	  Staline	  en	  Europe,	  1930–1939	  (Paris:	  Payot,	  2001).	  	  99	  The	  Italian	  Ministry	  of	  Colonies,	  due	  to	  its	  presence	  in	  Libya,	  Eritrea	  and	  Italian	  Somalia,	  was	  plunged	  into	  the	  Middle	  Eastern	  migration	  area	  of	  locusts,	  which	  explained	  its	  interest	  for	  in	  the	  problem	  in	  during	  the	  1930s:.	  Giulio	  Trinchieri,	  Secondo	  Contributo	  alla	  bibliografia	  delle	  cavallette	  (Rome:	  Istituto	  Poligrafico	  dello	  Stato,	  1933);	  Anonymous,	  ‘La	  lotta	  contro	  le	  cavallette	  in	  Eritrea	  e	  la	  conferenza	  intercoloniale	  di	  Chartum’,	  Rassegna	  Economica	  delle	  Colonie	  7–8	  (1929):	  3–33.	  	  100	  Letter	  from	  to	  the	  Soviet	  ambassador	  in	  Kabul,	  Stark,	  to	  the	  Afghan	  Foreign	  Minister,	  Faiz	  Muhammad	  Khan,	  F.P.	  Polia	  et	  al.	  (eds)	  Dokumenty	  vneshnej	  politiky	  SSSR,	  Vol.	  15,	  (Moscow,	  Gospolitizdat,	  1970)F.P.	  Polia	  et	  alii	  (eds.),	  DVP	  SSSR,	  Vol.	  15,	  1970,	  pp.	  28–29.	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followed	  a	  decision	  by	   the	  All-­‐Union	  Sovnarkom,	  on	  11	   July	  1932.101	  The	  object	  of	   the	  convention	  was	   seemingly	   clear:	   it	  was	   to	   fix	  once	  and	   for	   all	   the	   conditions	  of	   cross-­‐border	  anti-­‐acridian	  cooperation.	  The	  Soviets	  wanted	   to	  dispense	  with	   tedious	  annual	  negotiations	   about	   these	   conditions.	   Signatory	   states	   committed	   to	   anti-­‐locust	   actions	  and	  mutual	  information	  and	  each	  gave	  access	  to	  the	  counterpart’s	  anti-­‐acridian	  teams	  in	  case	  they	  could	  not	  deal	  independently	  with	  the	  locust	  threat.	  Each	  state	  should	  finance	  works	   undertaken	   on	   its	   own	   soil,	   even	   if	   they	   were	   performed	   by	   experts	   from	   the	  other	  state.	  This	  was	  a	  clear	  departure	  from	  anterior	  practices,	  when	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  funded	  a	  large	  part	  of	  locust	  operations	  in	  Persia	  and	  Afghanistan.	  Whereas	  Soviet	  diplomats	  could	  propose	  sufficient	  incentives	  to	  Afghanistan	  and	  had	  the	  political	  clout	  to	  force	  the	  convention	  upon	  an	  utterly	  weak	  state,102	  Iran	  resisted	  the	  adoption	  of	  such	  a	  convention	  until	  August	  1936.103	  A	  probable	  fear	  was	  the	  loss	  of	  sovereignty	  entailed	  by	  the	  convention,	  which	  set	  a	  strict	  schedule	  for	  operations	  and	  numerous	  obligations	  for	  information	  exchange.	  The	  convention	  created	  a	  potential	  risk	  of	  unwanted	  intrusion	  by	   Soviet	   expeditions	   and	   locust	   teams.	   Iranian	   leaders	   were	   growing	   ever	   wearier	  about	   Soviet	   interventions	   in	   the	   country	   since	   the	   former	  OGPU	  agent	  Agabekov	  had	  revealed	   how	   deeply	   Soviet	   intelligence	   services	   had	   colonised	   the	   Iranian	   higher	  administration.104	  Large	   numbers	   of	   Soviet	   citizens	   had	   fled	   the	   USSR	   as	   a	   result	   of	  collectivisation	  and	  lived	  in	  Northern	  Iran	  since	  1929,	  creating	  an	  overall	  hostile	  mood	  to	   the	   communist	   regime.	  This	   explained	  a	   certain	   reluctance	   to	   admit	  massive	   locust	  expeditions	  in	  Persia.	  	  Evolutions	  in	  Soviet	  locust	  diplomacy	  in	  the	  1930s	  have	  to	  be	  connected	  to	  an	  important	  scientific	  debate	  that	  stirred	  academic	  circles	  in	  the	  country.	  Since	  the	  late	  1920s,	  a	  new	  acridian	  species	  had	  come	  to	  the	  forefront	  as	  perhaps	  the	  most	  dangerous	  and	  virulent,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  M.A.	  Sivolobov	  (ed.),	  DVP	  SSSR,	  Vol.	  17,	  1971,	  p.	  832.	  	  102	  See	  the	  text	  of	  the	  convention,	  signed	  on	  6	  May	  1935,	  in	  Sobranie	  zakonov	  SSSR,	  Section	  I,	  No.	  16,	  1	  October	  1935,	  pp.	  255–258.	  	  103	  Letter	  from	  Karakhan	  to	  Pastukhov,	  2	  August	  Aug.	  1933	  ;	  F.P.	  Polia	  et	  al.	  (eds.),	  Dokumenty	  vneshnej	  
politikyDVP	  	  SSSR,	  Vol.	  15,	  1970,	  Moscow,	  Gospolitizdat,	  1970,	  pp.	  474–476;	  British	  Legation	  in	  Tehran	  to	  the	  Foreign	  Office,	  20	  February	  Feb.	  1936,	  NHMA,	  AL/2/100.	  	  104	  Taline	  Ter-­‐Minassian,	  Colporteurs	  du	  Komintern.	  L’Union	  soviétique	  et	  les	  minorités	  au	  Moyen-­‐Orient	  ,	  pp.	  142–4	  (Paris:	  Presses	  de	  la	  Fondation	  Nationale	  des	  Sciences	  Politiques,	  1997)	  pp.	  142–4.	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the	  Schistocerca	  gregaria	  Forsk.105	  Activity	   cycles	  had	  already	  happened	   in	  1900–1904	  and	  1911–1916,	  but	  a	  violent	  outburst	  occurred	  in	  1925–1931,	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  Iran	  and	   Southern	   Soviet	   republics. 106 	  In	   London,	   the	   Imperial	   Bureau	   of	   Entomology	  pioneered	  research	  on	  this	  new	  species	  and	  its	  geographical	  area,	  as	  numerous	  British	  regions	  were	  concerned.	  The	  extensive	  consular	  network	  in	  Persia	  and	  the	  Perso-­‐Arabic	  Gulf	  was	  put	  to	  use,	  as	  well	  as	  connections	  with	  the	  Persian	  administration.107	  In	  1929,	  Uvarov	  agreed	  to	  write	  a	  general	  brochure	  on	  the	  Schistocerca	  and	  opened	  a	  debate	  on	  its	   geographical	   origin.108	  He	   considered	   this	   locust	   to	   be	   endogenous	   in	   southern	  Persia,	   notably	   Beluchistan	   and	   Farsistan.	   It	   then	   migrated	   northward	   to	   the	   Soviet	  Union.	  His	  opinion	  was	  supported	  by	  an	  expedition	  made	  in	  Eastern	  Iran	  in	  1930–1931	  by	  Professor	  Predtechenskij,	  who	  described	  the	  life	  cycle	  of	  the	  Schistocerca.	  It	  nested	  in	  Southern	   Iran,	   where	   annual	   average	   temperatures	   hovered	   around	   24–27	   degrees	  Celsius.	  Its	  migration	  started	  in	  February	  and	  Schistocerca	  swarms	  followed	  vegetation	  areas,	  since	  they	  needed	  food	  on	  the	  road.	  Four	  main	  roads	  could	  be	  distinguished,	  with	  a	  major	   corridor	   in	   the	   Karun	   valley	   to	   Persian	   and	   Soviet	   Azerbaijan.109	  The	   opinion	  that	   Schistocerca	   was	   a	   purely	   Iranian	   phenomenon	   was	   not	   entirely	   shared	   among	  Soviet,	  Iranian	  and	  British	  scientists.110	  N.	  Shcherbinovskij	  was	  the	  fiercest	  opponent	  of	  this	   thesis	   and	   developed	   a	   theory	   of	  migrations	   on	   a	   continental	   scale.	   According	   to	  him,	   conditions	   for	   the	   massive	   reproduction	   of	   locusts	   existed	   only	   in	   the	   Arabic	  Peninsula,	  British	  India	  and	  Eastern	  Africa.	  His	  opinion,	  in	  the	  1930s,	  was	  still	  a	  minority	  one	   and	   could	   hardly	   compete	   with	   the	   combined	   prestige	   of	   Uvarov	   and	  Predtechenskij.	   Nonetheless,	   the	   debate	   between	   Shcherbinovskij	   and	   his	   illustrious	  predecessors	   was	   broached	   at	   a	   trilateral	   conference	   between	   the	   USSR,	   Iran	   and	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  F.S.	  Bodenheimer	  and,	  G.	  Fraenkel,	  ‘	  ‘Studien	  zur	  Epidemiologie,	  Ökologie	  und	  Physiologie	  der	  afrikanischen	  Wanderheuschrecke	  (Schistocerca	  gregaria	  Forsk.)’,	  Zeitschrift	  für	  angewandte	  Entomologie,	  B.	  15	  /	  ,	  H.	  3,	  pp.:	  435–457.	  	  106	  Protocol	  No.	  127	  of	  the	  Transcaucasian	  Sovnarkom,	  SUITsA,	  f.	  617,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  4979,	  l.	  21.	  	  107	  Letter	  from	  Ahmed	  ‘Adl	  to	  Boris	  Uvarov,	  Teheran,	  10	  May	  1930,	  NHMA,	  AL/2/100.	  	  108	  Boris	  Uvarov,	  Pustynnaja	  sarancha	  Shistocerca	  gregaria	  (Moscow:	  Gostekhizdatel’stvo,	  1929).	  	  109	  S.	  Predtechenskij,	  ‘Pustynnaja	  sarancha	  v	  Persii	  	  (Schistocerca	  gregaria	  Forsk)’,	  Sbornik	  Vsesojuznogo	  
Instituta	  zashchity	  rastenij,	  No.	  4,	  pp.4:	  72–76	  (Leningrad:	  VIZR,	  1932);	  see	  also	  S.	  Predtechenskij,	  ‘Materialy	  po	  izucheniu	  pustynnoj	  saranchi	  v	  Srednej	  Azii	  i	  Zakavkaz’e	  v	  1929–1930	  gg.’,	  Trudy	  po	  
zashchite	  rastenij	  ,	  Vol.	  11,	  	  (1935):,	  pp.	  1–91.	  	  110	  The	  original	  Iranian	  position	  is	  summed	  up	  in	  a	  memorandum	  of	  the	  Persian	  Ministry	  for	  Foreign	  Affairs	  to	  the	  British	  legation,	  Teheran,	  22	  October	  1929,	  NHMA,	  AL/2/100.	  See	  also	  D.P.	  Dovnar-­‐Zapolsky,	  Data	  on	  the	  biology	  of	  the	  Schistocerca	  Gregaria	  Forsk,	  3	  October	  1930,	  NHMA,	  AL/2/100.	  	  
	   28	  
Turkey,	  held	  in	  Moscow	  in	  July	  1930,	  where	  the	  geographical	  scope	  of	  the	  Schistocerca	  was	   addressed.111	  Shcherbinovskij	   eventually	   succeeded	   in	   disseminating	   his	   ideas	   in	  the	  late	  1930s	  and	  used	  the	  Soviet	  occupation	  of	  Iran	  after	  1941	  to	  test	  his	  theory	  and	  document	  it.	  After	  World	  War	  Two,	  it	  became	  the	  official	  doxa	  on	  Schistocerca	  migratory	  trajectories	   and	   legitimated	   the	   new	   course	   in	   Soviet	   locust	   diplomacy.	   This	   new	  scientific	  doctrine	  was	  in	  line	  with	  the	  now-­‐global	  ambitions	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  its	  willingness	  to	  provide	  development	  aid	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  countries	  in	  Africa,	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  the	  Indian	  sub-­‐continent.	  	  	  CONCLUSION	  The	   question	   of	   the	   origins	   of	   development	   policies	   remains	   a	   controversial	   one,	   and	  different	   genealogies	   have	   been	  mentioned.	   The	   gradual	   transition	   from	  development	  programmes	   in	   interwar	   colonial	   empires	   to	   development	   aid	   after	   decolonisation	   is	  emphasised,	   as	   a	   stain	   upon	   the	   very	   concept	   of	   development	   aid.112 	  The	   North-­‐American	   genealogy	   points	   to	   the	   role	   of	   private	   foundations	   and	   endowments	   in	   the	  1920s–1930s.113	  However,	   these	   genealogies	   cannot	   explain	   the	   evolution	   of	   Soviet	  foreign	   aid.	   The	   Cold	   War	   context	   obviously	   accounts	   for	   the	   tremendous	   rise	   in	  development	  assistance	  in	  the	  Third	  World.	  However,	  this	  connection	  should	  not	  erase,	  in	   our	   view,	   the	   weight	   of	   interwar	   experiences.	   The	   Soviet	   engagement	   with	   the	  acridian	   threat	  demonstrates	   the	  way	   first	  attempts	  were	  made	  at	  knowledge-­‐transfer	  and	  aid	  in	  the	  field	  of	  environmental	  and	  sanitary	  policies	  at	  the	  time.	  The	  peculiarity	  of	  this	   Soviet	   assistance	   is	   to	   overlap	   internal	   and	   external	   concerns.	   Actually,	   the	  modernisation	   promoted	   by	   Soviet	   authorities	   happened	   simultaneously	   in	   the	   Soviet	  republics	   of	   the	   Caucasus	   and	   Central	   Asia	   and	   in	  Middle	   Eastern	   or	   Asian	   countries	  bordering	   on	   the	   USSR.	   This	   gave	   an	   opportunity	   to	   present	   Soviet	   cooperation	   as	   a	  ‘brotherly	   help’	   and	  not	   as	   an	   imposition	   from	   the	  West.	   This	   factor	   explains	   the	   role	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  ‘Sovetsko-­‐turetsko-­‐persidskaja	  konferentsija	  po	  bor’be	  s	  vrediteljami	  sel’skogo	  khozjajstva’,	  Zarja	  
Vostoka	  193,	  2461	  (21	  July	  1930):	  1.	  	  112	  Barry	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played	   by	   Caucasian	   and	   Central	   Asian	   institutions	   in	   the	   process.	   Their	   cultural	   and	  regional	   expertise	   was	   considered	   an	   asset	   and	   Transcaucasian	   authorities	   were	  particularly	  keen	  to	  play	  an	  active	  role	  in	  the	  field.	  Progressively,	  the	  field	  of	  action	  was	  extended	  and,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1930s,	  one	  can	  observe	  the	  first	  signs	  of	  Soviet	  claims	  to	  environmental	  cooperation	  extending	   to	   the	  entire	  Middle	  East.	  Scientific	  advance	  had	  its	   share	   in	   this	   evolution,	   since	   it	   seemed	   to	   confirm	   the	   continental	   range	   of	  
Schistocerca	   locust	   invasions.	  The	  Soviet	   example	   thus	  demonstrates	   a	   similar	   tension	  between	   the	   apparently	   objective	   dimension	   of	   environmental	   management	   and	   its	  highly	  political	  message,	  embodying	  a	  vision	  of	  what	  modernity	  means.	  	  	  	  	  	  
